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DEF 15 RYUIS-US

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR DEF 12 US

Tokyo 10007 12-14-69

CONFIDENTIAL 740

PAGE 01 TOKYO 10007 140423Z

84
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 SS-20 NSC-10 L-03 H-02 CIAE-00 INR-07
NSAE-00 RSC-01 P-03 PRS-01 ACDA-18 MC-02 IO-13 USIA-12
AEC-11 RSR-01 /120 W 035959

P 140300Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 26
INFO DOD WASHDC
WICOMRY
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
COMUSJAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 10007

SUBJ: INACTIVATION OF 498TH TAC MISSILE GRP

REF: SECDEF MSG 06190 FROM OASD (PA) 112246Z DEC 69

1. CHIBA (HEAD FONOFF NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION) CALLED POL COUNSELOR EARLY MORNING DEC 14 TO DRAW ATTENTION TO TOP STORY IN ASAHI. HEADLINE STATES THAT USG WILL ANNOUNCE INTENTION WITHDRAW OKINAWA MAC B'S WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND THAT WITHDRAWAL ITSELF WILL COME DURING 1970, SOMEWHAT EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. HISTORY ALLEGES THAT ACCORDING TO CLARIFICATION FROM GOJ SOURCES EVENING DEC 13, USG HAD RECENTLY INFORMED GOJ THAT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE AROUND DEC 15. REFERS BACK TO FROMER SECDEF MACNAMARA'S 1965 TESTIMONY RE PROBABILITY THAT MACE B'S WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM SERVICE BY EARLY 1970'S, AND CONCLUDES WITHDRAWAL FROM OKINAWA WILL COME EARLIER THAN ANTICIPATED. SPECULATE THAT REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL UNDOUBTEDLY RELATED TO FACT THAT MACE B'S ARE OBSOLESCENT, BUT THAT TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT PROBABLY REFLECTS DESIRE TO GIVE LDP A BOOST DURING CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN. SAYS GOJ LEADERS WILL USE ANNOUNCEMENT AS PROOF SATO DID OBTAIN NUCLEAR-FREE HOMELAND LEVEL REVERSION AGREEMENT, BUT OPPOSITION PARTIES ALREADY PREPARED DENOUNCE SUCH EFFORT AS INTENDED ONLY TO FOOL PEOPLE, CITING CONTINUED PRESENCE ON

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CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 10007 140423Z

OKINAWA OF OTHER TYPES NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. CHIBA LATER CALLED BACK TO QUOTE AP DESPATCH FROM WASHINGTON CITING "AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES" TO EFFECT WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND THAT GRI AND GOJ ALREADY INFORMED.

3. CHIBA AND LATER TOGO STATED THAT ASAHI STORY ORIGINATED WITH ASAHI WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF KITANI, AND THAT TOGO HAD DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE WHEN APPROACHED BY TWO ASAHI REPORTERS EVENING DEC 13. POL COUNSELOR INFORMED TOGO AND CHIBA OF SUBSTANCE REFTEL AT THIS POINT, REQUESTING THAT GOJ OFFICIALS REFRAIN FROM COMMENT ON ASAHI STORY UNTIL AFTER FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT MADE.

4. PRIME MINISTER WILL BE CAMPAIGNING IN MIYAZAKI THROUGHOUT DAY, RETURNING TO TOKYO LATE THIS EVENING. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY HORI IS PREPARING PRESS STATEMENT FOR USE WHEN ANNOUNCEMENT MADE WHICH WILL TAKE LINE THAT MACE B WITHDRAWAL REFLECTS PRESIDENT NIXON'S UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF PRIMIN SATO'S EXPOSITION OF JAPANESE DESIRE FOR NUCLEAR-FREE REVERSION. LDP POLITICIANS BELIEVE THIS LINE WILL BE USEFUL TO SATO IN CURRENT ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN AND HORI ASKED FONOFF TO PASS WORD THAT IF USG SPOKESMEN COULD NOT TAKE SIMILAR LINE THEY AT LEAST NOT DENY IT BY INSISTING TOO STRONGLY THAT WITHDRAWAL IS PURELY ROUTINE AFFAIR BASED ON PREVIOUS PLANNING. GP-3.
OSBORN

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Tokyo 9885 12-5-69

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 09885 050958Z

17
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 ACDA-18 IO-13 ~~RSR-01~~

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R 050902Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9946
INFO DA
CINCPAC
HICOMRY

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DA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA (IA)
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
HICOMRY ALSO PASS ADCOM

SUB: OKINAWA: CHEMICAL WEAPONS REMOVAL

REF: TOKYO 9835 - DEF 15 RYU IS - US
XR DEF 12 US

1. DECEMBER 4 MAINICHI PROVIDED SOLE JAPANESE EDITORIAL COMMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITHDRAWAL. ECHOING REACTION EXPRESSED BY CE YARA, EDITORIAL WELCOMED WITHDRAWAL, SURMISED THAT WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT TIMED FOR FORTHCOMING GENERAL ELECTION AND CONCLUDED WITH HOPE THAT B-52'S AND NUKES WILL ALSO BE REMOVED FROM OKINAWA "AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT."

2. COMMENT: SCANT AND PRO FORMA COMMENT RE ANNOUNCEMENT INDICATES THAT PRESS, PREOCCUPIED WITH ANALYSES OF OKINAWA SETTLEMENT AND WITH PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTION, TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY ANNOUNCEMENT. EXEMPT.

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XR DEF 12 US

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Takeyama 9649 11-24-69

PAGE 01 TOKYO 09649 241016Z

17
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-18 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 RSR-01 /099 W
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R 240815Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO CINCPAC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9797
DA
CINCPACAF
FIFTH AIR FORCE
COMUSJAPAN
HICOMRY
313 AIR DIV
OSAF WASHDC
OSD WASHDC

S E C R E T TOKYO 9649

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HICOMRY PASS ADCOM

SUBJ: MACE-B INACTIVATION

REF: TOKYO 8958, 9621

IF THERE IS ANY LATITUDE ON TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT MACE-B DEACTIVATION, SUGGEST RELEASE PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1 (JAPAN TIME) WITH GOJ AND YARA INFORMED PRIVATELY ON PRECEDING DAY. OPPOSITION QUESTIONING OF PRIMIN IN DIET WILL FOCUS ON MEANING OF OKINAWA COMMUNIQUE BEGINNING DECEMBER 1 (OR, AT LATEST, DEC 2) AND SATO COULD PUT ANNOUNCEMENT TO GOOD USE IN CONFOUNDING SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST CHARGES THAT "NUCLEAR FREE" REVERSION IS LIE. ABOVE SUGGESTION NOT CRUCIAL BUT EVERY LITTLE BIT HELPS AT ELECTION TIME. GP-3.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Tokyo 9621 11-21-69

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 09621 211115Z

12
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 PM-05 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00

RSC-01 ACDA-18 RSR-01 /078 W 044138

R 210850Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO CINCPAC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9782
DA
CINCPACAF
FIFTH AIR FORCE
COMUSJAPAN
HICOMRY
313 AIR DIV
OSAF WASHDC
OSD WASHDC

S E C R E T TOKYO 9621

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT IN PARA 1.)

DEF IS RYU IS - US
XR DEF 12 US

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HICOMRY PASS ADCOM

SUBJ: PROPOSED RELEASE ON MACE-B INACTIVATION

REFS: (A) CINCPACREP 080810Z NOV 69 (B) TOKYO 8958

1. KYODO REPORT NOVEMBER 21 CREDITS GOJ SOURCES IN WASHINGTON WITH NEWS THAT US HAS BEGUN REMOVAL NIKE-HERCULES FROM OKINAWA. SOURCE ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID MACE-B'S WOULD BE WITHDRAWN BY 1972.

2. WHEN OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF MACE-B DEACTIVATION IS MADE, IN ADDITION TO OUR COMMENTS IN REF B, SUGGEST ADDING THAT DEACTIVATION EXEMPLIFIES SPIRIT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN. GP-3.
OSBORN

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DEF 15 RYU JS-US

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XR DEF 12 US

Tokyo 9324 11-9-69

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 09324 091451Z

46
ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, PM 05, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, ACDA 10, AEC 11,
RSR 01, /096 W

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O R 091335Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9594
INFO DA
CINCPAC
CINCUSARPAC
HICOMRY

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA

SUBJECT: KOMEITO OKINAWA BASE STUDY HIGHLIGHTS NUKES AND CBW

SUMMARY. TO TUNE OF HEAVY PRESS COVERAGE ON NOVEMBER 9 KOMEITO HAS RELEASED "OKINAWAN BASE STUDY" NEATLY TIMING IT FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT PRIOR TO SATO VISIT. REPORT WILL BE "OFFICIALLY" PRESENTED TO PRIMIN NOVEMBER 10 AT HIS "SUMMIT MEETING" WITH KOMEITO AND DSP CHAIRMEN. LIKE EARLIER STUDY ON U.S. BASES IN JAPAN IT FOCUSES ON DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO LOCAL INHABITANTS AND QUESTION OF NEED FOR INSTALLATIONS, BUT PREOCCUPATION WITH NUCLEAR AND CBW QUESTIONS GIVES OKINAWA STUDY EVOCATIVE FLAVOR ALL ITS OWN. BECAUSE OF INTERMINABLE PRESS REPORTS ABOUT NUKES ON OKINAWA, STUDY WILL PROBABLY ONLY REINFORCE EXISTING NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST NUKES AFTER REVERSION. IN SHORT RUN, ACCUSATION TO EFFECT U.S. HAS DONE NOTHING AS YET TO REMOVE CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA PERHAPS MORE EMBARRASSING. END SUMMARY.

1. KOMEITO RELEASED OKINAWAN BASE STUDY TO TUNE OF HEAVY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 09324 091451Z

PRESS COVERAGE IN NOVEMBER 9'S PRESS. STUDY, DONE LARGELY BY KOMEIKAI IN OKINAWA. CLAIMED U.S. HAD 148 MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ON OKINAWA. 119 OF THEM IN CONSTANT USE, 11 USED OCCASIONALLY, 2 USED SEASONALLY, AND 19 UNUSED. STUDY CLAIMS 50 BASES ARE POTENTIALLY "DANGEROUS" BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS SYSTEMS, RADIOACTIVE OR CBW CONTAMINATION, OR LEAKAGE OF STORED FUELS. GRAND TOTAL OF 116 INSTALLATIONS CAUSE AT LEAST SOME ANNOYANCE TO NEIGHBORHOOD. REPORT ALSO SAW POSSIBILITY THAT IN FUTURE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO TURN BACK TO OKINAWANS OR GOJ 57 INSTALLATIONS AND PARTIALLY TURN BACK ANOTHER 43, BUT REMAINING 48 WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TOUCH.

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CBW WERE TREATED TOGETHER UNDER HEADING OF "PERILS OF NUCLEAR AND CBR (SIC) WEAPONS", SUGGESTING AUTHORS HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH ACRONYMS. MUCH OF WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT NUKES HAD ALREADY APPEARED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN PRESS BUT JAPANESE PRESS PLAYED UP ASSERTIONS ON MACE-B TARGETING, AND SUBROC STORAGE. IN ESSENCE, WITH RESPECTS TO NUKES, KOMEITO ASSERTED THAT A) NIKE HERCULES AND HAWK MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR TIPPED, B) OF 32 MACE B'S (PRESUMABLY BEARING HYDROGEN WEAPONS) IN POSITION, 24 "AIMED" AT COMMUNIST CHINA AND 8 AT NORTH KOREA "IN DIRECTION" OF JAPANESE ISLANDS, C) NUCLEAR TIPPED SUBROCS STORED AT HENOKO IN KUSHI VILLAGE IN NORTHERN OKINAWA, D) NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALONG WITH CBW WEAPONS STORED AT CHIBANA IN KOZA CITY AND E) RED PAINTED BOMBS (BELIEVED TO BE NUCLEAR WEAPONS) ARE HAULED BETWEEN CHIBANA AND KADENA AFB IN DEAD OF NIGHT. STUDY ASSERTED THAT VERY LOCATION OF CHIBANA "ADJOINING END OF RUNWAY" WAS DANGEROUS IN THAT B-52 OR OTHER PLANE MIGHT CRASH INTO DUMP.

3. STUDY CLAIMED CBW WEAPONS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY STILL BEING STORED AT CHIBANA. REPORTS NOTES STORM OF PROTEST AROUSED BY DISCLOSURE OF CBW INCIDENT AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THEY WERE IN PROCESS OF BEING REMOVED, BUT SAYS NO CHANGE HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN OPERATIONS AT CHIBANA. STUDY ALSO CITES CBW SENSITIVITIES IN AMERICA AND U.S. CONGRESS. SECTION CONCLUDES BY ACCUSING GOJ OF STAGING BIG SHOW IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS ABOUT OPPOSITION TO CBW BUT UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO FIND OUT SIMPLE FACTS ABOUT WHETHER CBW AGENTS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN REMOVED, THUS REVEALING ITSELF TO WORLD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 09324 091451Z

AS HYPOCRITICAL ON MATTER.

4. WITH RESPECT TO REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS, KOMEITO STUDY IN EFFECT QUESTIONS GOVERNMENT'S SINCERITY IN SEEKING PROFESSED GOAL OF "HOMELAND LEVEL, NUCLEAR FREE" REVERSION AND WARNS GOVERNMENT TO HEW TO HOMELAND LEVEL LINE.

5. COMMENT. LIKE MUCH EARLIER STUDY ON U.S. BASES IN JAPAN, KOMEITO STUDY SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME ON REAL OR SUPPOSED DANGERS AND INCONVENIENCES TO LOCAL INHABITANTS, BUT PREOCCUPATION WITH NUCLEAR AND CBW QUESTIONS GIVES SPECIAL TWIST NOT FOUND IN STUDY ON JAPAN PROPER. TIMING OF STUDY'S RELEASE DICTATED BY SATO VISIT AND DESIRE TO MAKE IT PUBLIC PRIOR TO SECOND "SUMMIT MEETING" NOVEMBER 10 BETWEEN PRIMIN (IN CAPACITY AS LDP PRESIDENT) AND CHAIRMEN OF THE KOMEITO AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS. KOMEITO WILL PRESENT STUDY "OFFICIALLY" TO SATO AT MEETING AND OBVIOUSLY HOPES TO MAKE ELECTORAL CAPITAL OUT OF IT.

6. NUCLEAR QUESTION IS, IN EMOTIONAL SENSE, MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF REVERSION TERMS FOR JAPANESE PUBLIC, BUT THERE HAS BEEN SO MUCH REPORTED IN PRESS ABOUT NUKES ON OKINAWA THAT KOMEITO'S CONTRIBUTIONS PROBABLY ADD LITTLE TO DEBATE, ALTHOUGH STUDY SHOULD REINFORCE EXISTING NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST NUKES AFTER REVERSION. IN SHORT RUN STUDY'S SURMISES ABOUT CONTINUED CBW STORAGE ARE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO BE MORE EMBARRASSING.
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46

DEF 15 Ryu Is - US

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XR DEF 12 US

Tokyo 8958 10-29-69

SECRET 745

PAGE 01 TOKYO 08958 291123Z

22S
ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01,SS 20,PM 05,CIAE 00,INR 07,NSAE 00,RSC 01,NSC 10,ACDA 16,

RSR 01,/076 W ---------- 029285

R 290925Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO CINCPAC HAWAII
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9354
CINCPACAF HAWAII
5TH AIR FORCE FUCHU
COMUS JAPAN
HICOMRY OKINAWA
313 AIR DIVISION
OSAF WASHDC
OSD WASHDC

S E C R E T TOKYO 8958

SUBJ: PROPOSED RELEASE ON MACE-B INACTIVATION

REFS: A. CINCPACAF 280406Z OCT 69
B. CSAF 282303Z OCT 69

1. RE TEXT PROPOSED RELEASE, CONCUR AS TO DESIRABILITY OF WORDING WHICH WOULD HELP COUNTER LIKELY CLAIMS BY ANTI-U.S. ELEMENTS THAT RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS ARE FORCING US TO WITHDRAW FROM OKINAWA. HOWEVER, ATTRIBUTION OF INACTIVATION SOLELY TO BUDGET CUTS AND WORLDWIDE REDUCTION OF FORCES SEEMS UNNECESSARILY DEFENSIVE, WOULD ALSO GIVE COMFORT TO THOSE CHARGING WE ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN SAVING MONEY, AND ARE GIVING SCANT ATTENTION TO MAINTAINING CAPABILITY MEET OUT COMMITMENTS IN PACIFIC.

2. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT RELEASE EMPHASIZE CONSISTENCY OF FORCE REDUCTIONS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECLARED POLICY OF COMBINING CONTINUED FAITHFUL ADHERENCE TO PRESENT U.S. COMMITMENTS WITH ORDERLY AND RESPONSIBLE MOVEMENT BY OTHERS TOWARD GREATER SELF-RELIANCE. POINT COULD BE MADE THAT WHILE U.S. INTENDS RETAIN THOSE FORCES AND BASES NEEDED MEET COMMITMENTS, HOLDING FORCES AND BASES TO NECESSARY MINIMUM WILL NOT ONLY REDUCE COSTS, BUT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 08958 291123Z

ALSO ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS STRENGTHS AND SELF-RELIANCE.

3. IN ORDER GAIN SOME GREATER FLAVOR OF CONSULTATION WITH GOJ PRIOR TO TAKING PHASE-OUT ACTION, MIGHT IT NOT BE POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE SAY WE HAD DISCUSSED TIMING OF PHASE-OUT WITH GOJ, EXPLAINING THAT TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE PHASE-OUT MACE-B AT THIS TIME WITHOUT UNDUE DEGRADATION OVERALL U.S. DETERRENT CAPABILITY?

4. EMBASSY CONTINUES STRONGLY SUPPORT POINT MADE PARA 2 REFTEL B, I.E. THAT ANNOUNCEMENT BE WITHHELD UNTIL AFTER NIXON-SATO MEETING. GP-4.
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 08813 241035Z

18
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 /CIAE-00 PM-05 HI-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 ACDA-16 AEC-11 RSR-01 SCI-05 IO-13 /126 W
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P R 240900Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9257
INFO DOD WASHDC
HICOMRY OKINAWA
CINCPAC HAWAII

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 8813

SUBJ: ALLEGED NUCLEAR PATROLS BY B-52 BOMBERS FROM OKINAWA

DEF 12 US
REF: TOKYO 8801 240840Z XR DEF 15 RYU IS-US

FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT KYODO RELEASE REFERRED REFTEL:

BEGIN TEXT. AMERICAN B-52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS, CARRYING HYDROGEN BOMBS, HAVE BEEN ON REGULAR PATROL MISSIONS TO CHINA AND NORTH KOREA FROM US KADENA AIR BASE IN OKINAWA, ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES. RELIABLE SOURCES IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN HERE SAID THESE BOMBERS OF US AIR FORCE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (SAC) HAVE ALSO BEEN PUT ON 24-HOUR ALERT. THE HANDLING OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN OKINAWA AND B-52 SORTIES FROM US-HELD ISLANDS TO SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE COME FOCAL ISSUES OF THE JAPAN-US NEGOTIATIONS ON OKINAWA REVERSION. IF IT IS TRUE THAT STRATEGIC BOMBERS, BELIEVED TO NUMBER SOME 20, CARRY NUCLEAR BOMBS AND PLACED ON 24-HOUR AIRBORNE ALERT, A COMPLETELY NEW ISSUE HAS BEEN CREATED. ABOUT 18 B-52 BOMBERS FIRST CAME TO KADENA AIR BASE FROM GUAM IN FEBRUARY LAST YEAR OSTENSIBLY TO "TAKE REFUGEE" FROM TYPHOONS, BUT THEY HAVE SINCE REMAINED ON HUGE AIR BASE AND ENGAGED IN BOMBING MISSIONS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. AT PRESENT, THESE SOURCES SAID, B-52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS IN A SIX-PLANE FORMATION TAKE OFF FROM KADENA AROUND 2:30 P.M. EVERY DAY AND RETURN TO BASE FOLLOWING MORNING. THEY ARE ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY KC-135 TANKERS, THEY SAID. THE SOURCES BELIEVED THAT AT LEAST FOUR B-52 B AT

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Tokyo 8801 10-24-69

PAGE 01 TOKYO 08801 241002Z

16 S
ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01 SCI 05 CIAE 00 PM 05 HI 02 INR 07 L 03 NSAE 00 NSC 10 P 00
RSC 01 PRS 01 SS 20 USIA 12 RSR 01 ACDA 16 IO 13 /115 W
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P R 240840Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9262
INFO DOD WASHDC
HICOMRY OKINAWA
CINCPAC HAWAII

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 8801

SUBJ: ALLEGED NUCLEAR PATROLS BY B-52 BOMBERS FROM OKINAWA

1. OCT 23 KYODO RELEASE (FULL TEXT BY SEPTEL) QUOTING RELIABLE SOURCES JAPAN AND OKINAWA TO EFFECT B-52'S BASED OKINAWA HAVE BEEN CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON REGULAR PATROL MISSIONS TO CHINA AND NORTH KOREA DREW HEADLINES IN OCT 24 TOKYO SHIMBUN AND PROMINENT FRONT PAGE PLAY ALL OTHER DAILIES. STORY ALSO INSPIRED RASH OF SECONDARY ACCOUNTS FROM CORRESPONDENTS OF INDIVIDUAL NEWSPAPERS BASED OKINAWA AND WASHINGTON, PLUS COMMENTARIES BY SUPPOSEDLY KNOWLEDGEABLE DEFENSE CRITICS, THRUST OF WHICH HAS GENERALLY LENT CREDENCE TO IMAGINATIVE ACCOUNT PROVIDED ORIGINAL KYODO RELEASE.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES, GOJ SPOKESMEN AND OFFICIALS HAVE ATTEMPTED DISCREDIT KYODO ACCOUNT. ACCORDING TO PRESS, DEPUTY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY KIMURA "STRONGLY DENIED" REPORT, SAYING THAT "ACCORDING TO WHAT GOJ HAS HEARD, B-52'S STATIONED IN OKINAWA RE NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NECESSITY (FOR SUCH ACTIONS). EVEN ON BASIS US-JAPAN CONTACTS SO FAR, THIS IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY (ARI ENAI KOTO DA)." PRESS ACCOUNTS ATTRIBUTED TO JDA STATEMENT THAT THIS WAS FIRST TIME AGENCY HAD HEARD REPORT THAT OKINAWA B-52'S CONDUCTING NUCLEAR ARMED PATROLS AND THAT IT JDA UNDERSTANDING THAT B-52'S PROVIDE ADEQUATE DETERRENT STRENGTH WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH PRESS INTERPRETED AS EXPRESSION OF DOUBT. GEN EIICHI UEMURA, OF JDA AIR STAFF OFFICE, QUOTED AS OF VIEW

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ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-6

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ARA	EUR	FE
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AEC 9	ACDA 17	S/PM 1 SC 5
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 5
ARMY 3	CIA 20	NAVY 5
OSO 34	USIA 10	NSA 3
		NSC 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUG 18 10 27 AM 1969

INFO : HICOMRY, OASD, CINCUSARPAC, DA, CINCPAC DA for ODCSOPS Pass ODUSA (IA); OASD for PA; CINCPAC for POLAD; HICOMRY ALSO PASS ADCOM.

AS/AN ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TOKYO

DATE: 14 August 1969

SUBJECT : Sohyo Convention Documents on Okinawa

REF : Tokyo's 6069

Enclosed is the resolution adopted on the first day of the Sohyo Convention protesting against the disposition of "poison gas" on Okinawa, as well as the text of the address delivered by Zengunro Chairman Uehara to the Sohyo Convention. Highlights of these two documents are summarized in the reference telegram.

Action assigned to EA/J

Action Taken noted

Date of Action 6/20/69

Action Office Symbol EA/J

Name of Officer

MEYER

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN and PACIFIC AFFAIRS

1969 AUG 19 PM 3 48

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure 1

Enclosure 2

1969 AUG 18 PM 2 19

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FORM 4-69 DS-323

Drafted by: LABATT:HTRobinson/ba 8/12/69

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:WCUnningham

Clearances:

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

From the Stenographic Records of the 38th Regular Convention of Sohyo (General Council of Japan Trade Unions) -- First Day

July 20-24, 1969

Compiled under the Supervision of Sohyo Education and Propaganda Bureau

Resolution for Protesting against Disposition of Poison Gas on Okinawa and Demanding Immediate Retraction of Unjust Oppression against All Independent Labor Unions

According to reports, poison gas or VX nerve gas leaked out at a U.S. military base on Okinawa, inflicting damage upon 24 U.S. military personnel. We received a strong shock from the fact that these inhumane weapons have been stationed secretly on Okinawa.

That nuclear weapons lie stored on Okinawa is a well-known fact. And furthermore, as seen in the accident of explosion of a B-52 plane last year, we definitely cannot disregard the reality where the Japanese people on Okinawa are exposed to the danger to life constantly.

We have been protesting with anger against the fact that the American Government is using chemical and biological weapons in Vietnam, without ratifying the 1929 Geneva Protocol concerning a ban on use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons as military means.

We sharply protest against the fact that these weapons have been brought into Japanese territory, Okinawa, and that they are threatening the lives of the Japanese.

We cannot but attach importance to the point that there is a danger of these weapons for sweeping murder being brought into the American military bases anywhere.

We, accordingly, strongly demand that the American Government immediately remove chemical and biological weapons from all the bases, including Okinawa, and remove all military bases, too.

We must lodge a complaint against the fact that this occupation and rule over Okinawa by the American Forces, in disregard of humanity, have appeared in the form of armed intervention in strikes which are the universal right for workers and then the notification of punishments including dismissal against Zen Gunro (All-Okinawa Military Employees Union) as we see at present. We cannot but feel fresh indignation at the haughty attitude of the American Forces which stress a generous, sensible attitude as if demanding gratitude, in spite of the infringement on human rights through unjust oppression.

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We demand retraction of these punishments to the last and, at the same time, we confirm our moral and material support and solidarity toward our comrades of Zen Gunro who are fighting together. We protest, furthermore, against the fact that the lives and livelihood of the people of Okinawa Prefecture are thus being threatened, and protest against the Japanese Government's diplomacy toward the United States.

We sharply confront this irresponsible, unlawful attitude of the Japanese and U.S. Governments, resolve to advance further the struggles for immediate removal of poison gas, nuclear weapons, and B-52 planes, retraction of unjust oppression, and immediate, unconditional, and total reversion of Okinawa, by the hands of all the democratic forces in the homeland and on Okinawa, and call upon the workers of America, Vietnam, and the entire world for international solidarity for these struggles.

July 20, 1969

General Council of Japan Trade Unions.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

Address by Zen Gunro Chairman UEHARA

Workers of the entire nation who have gathered here at the 38th Regular Convention of Sohyo, thank you very much for your efforts. My name is UEHARA, as has been mentioned in my introduction by the Chairman, and I serve as the Vice-Chairman of the Okinawa Prefectural Council of Labor Unions. I am deeply grateful that I have been able to attend the Sohyo Regular Convention today as a special representative, representing the Prefectural Labor Council, and that you adopted a special resolution at the outset of the Convention particularly against the unjust affairs of America which are now arising in Okinawa. And also I wish to express my deep gratitude to you members of the Convention Steering Committee and the Board of Chairmen for your permission for giving me an opportunity to speak.

Since this is a valuable time space during the Convention, I would like to speak very briefly on the problems facing Okinawa, what the one million people of Okinawa Prefecture are now seeking, what they are expecting from you members of Sohyo, and what they are going to appeal to the one hundred million people in the homeland.

Needless to say, Okinawa is promoting struggles for recovering the rights as Japanese nationals and winning unconditional, total reversion to the fatherland, under the military and colonial control of America which has been continuing for more than twenty years. As a link in these struggles, all democratic forces rallied together and realized the successful birth of reformist Chief Executive YARA last November. We firmly believe that this victory was brought about only with the great support from both moral and material aspects of the democratic forces of the homeland centering on you members of Sohyo. On this point, I wish to take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude anew. (Applause)

On the basis of these struggles, we organized the Prefectural people's joint struggles for defending lives in order to repulse the unjust, unlawful rule of America and have been promoting struggles for removing B-52 planes. To our regret, we have been unable to lead the struggles to a success.

I wish to offer our apology, taking this opportunity again, for having put you members of the Sohyo Headquarters to trouble on that point. The autonomous judgment in avoiding the February 4 general strike rested with the Prefectural Labor Council. I wish to say once again here at this place that we had received no instructions from you people of Sohyo.

Overcoming this sense of setback, we have fought through the 1969 spring struggles. In the struggles, America has been carrying out all kinds of oppression against Okinawa Zen Gunro, unjustly. As has much been in newspapers for the past two or three days, furthermore, poison gas or murder

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weapons lie stored on Okinawa. We think this is not merely a problem of the people of Okinawa Prefecture alone but also a problem of the one hundred million people of Japan and all mankind who hope for world peace. In this connection, and with regard to the fact that Sohyo adopted a special resolution at the outset of the Convention, I wish to offer my gratitude as a representative of all the people of Okinawa Prefecture.

With your support, we will strengthen our struggles, rejecting all kinds of oppression, in the future. In conclusion, I would like to wish Sohyo limitless development, entreat its further support for all our struggles on Okinawa, and pledge that we, too, will fight to the utmost of our power. Thank you (Applause)

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 08746 221301Z

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ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 PM-05 NSC-10 LI-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00

RSC-01 DODE-00 RSR-01 /064 W 118209

R 221010Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9834
INFO HICOMRY OKINAWA
FIFTH AF FUCHU
CINCPAC HAWAII

S E C R E T TOKYO 8746

SUBJ: INACTIVATION OF 498 TAC MISSILE GROUP

1. EMBASSY HAS JUST RECEIVED PROPOSED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO EFFECT THAT 498 TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP BASED ON OKINAWA IS TO BE INACTIVATED IN DECEMBER. 498TH IS UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR MACE-B MISSILES. ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED RELEASE DATE WAS OCT 21; FIFTH AF NOW THINKING IN TERMS FIRST WEEK NOVEMBER.

2. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF TAIL WAGGING THE DOG. ANNOUNCEMENT OF MACE-B INACTIVATION AT THIS TIME WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE READ BY JAPANESE AS CLEAR INDICATION US POSITION ON NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THEREFORE BOUND TO AFFECT OKINAWA REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS.

3. WHILE RECOGNIZING PROBLEMS INVOLVED, DESIRABILITY OF EXTRACTING GOOD PUBLICITY AND QUID PRO QUO FOR THESE UNITS BEING INACTIVATED AS RESULT OF BUDGET REDUCTIONS, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IN CASE OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE UNITS THE DECISION FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT NOT BE MADE PRIOR TO SATO VISIT NOV 19-21. IN ANY EVENT ANNOUNCEMENT EVEN AFTER THAT DATE SHOULD NOT BE TREATED IN ROUTINE MANNER AND GOJ SHOULD BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE.

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01,CIAE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 03,
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P R 300110Z AUG 69
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD
DA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA (IA)
HICOMRY PASS ADCOM

SUB: PRESS TREATMENT MEYER-AICHI AUGUST 28 MEETING

REF: A. TOKYO 7079 (NOTAL) B. TOKYO 7080 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. ON AUGUST 29 ALL MAJOR NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS CARRIED ELMMARIES, BASED ON FONOFF BRIEFING, OF AMB MEYER MEETING WITH FONMIN AICHI ON PRECEDING DAY. ALTHOUGH EMPHASIS VARIED THEY AGREED THAT NIXON-SATO SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN MID-NOVEMBER AND INDICATED THAT CENTRAL POINT OF FORTHCOMING ROGERS-AICHI MEETING WOULD BE QUESTIONS OF PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND USE OF BASES AFTER OKINAWAN REVERSION. END OF SUMMARY.

2. AUGUST 29 PRESS ARTICLES ON AUGUST 28 MEETING BETWEEN AMB MEYER AND FONMIN AICHI, BASED ON FONOFF BRIEFING, INDICATED THAT MEETING REVIEWED PROGRESS TO DATE OF WORKING LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS. REPORTS STATED PRIMIN SATO WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON IN MID-NOVEMBER, BUT THAT FINAL DATE OF VISIT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Sun Moon Lake PRIORITY
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD Honolulu

129271

SUBJECT: Removal of Nuclear Weapons from Okinawa claims,

1. Reuters news item from Tokyo August second, inter alia, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ "Rogers agreed settle return of Okinawa with American bases to remain ~~xxxx~~ there under same conditions as those on the Mainland of Japan i.e. no nuclear weapons and prior consultation before U.S. forces could be deployed against another country."

2. If asked, Department press spokesman plans state that the subject of Okinawa was throughly discussed by Secretary Rogers and the Japanese Foreign Minister but that no definate decisions or agreements were reached on any specific subjects.

END

RICHARDSON

Drafted by: EA/PJPHeimann:cb 8/2/69 | Tel. Ext. 22538 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - John Heimann

Clearances: EA - Mr. Brown (subs)
EA/J - Mr. Breer (draft)
P/ON - Mr. Bartch (draft)
S/S - ~~XXXXX~~ Mr. Brown

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 09835 030918Z

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ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-18 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9919
INFO DA
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CINCUSARPAC
HICOMRY

UNCLAS TOKYO 9835

DA FOR ODCSOPS PASS ODUSA (IA)
OASD FOR PA
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
HICOMRY ALSO PASS ADCOM

SUBJ: GOJ COMMENT ON REMOVAL OF LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

FROM OKINAWA

1. ANNOUNCEMENT OF REMOVAL OF LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA RECEIVED HEAVY FRONT-PAGE PLAY DECEMBER 3 EVENING TOKYO PRESS.

2. TOKYO SHIMBUN QUOTED CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY HORI AS STATING IN REGARD TO REMOVAL QUOTE THIS CAN BE CONSIDERED THE FIRST STEP TOWARD REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR (SIC) WEAPONS AT THE TIME OF REVERSION OF OKINAWA. THE GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THIS. UNQUOTE.
OSBORN

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
Amembassy TAIPEI
Amembassy SEOUL
CINCPAC
HICOMRY
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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Honolulu

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Excerpts from Department's press briefing of Oct. 24, 1969

BEGIN TEXT.

Q. Bob, several months ago you told us that ~~preparations~~ preparations were being made for the removal of tear gas and other biological and chemical warfare weapons from Okinawa. Could you say what the status is now? Have they been removed?

A. No, I cannot. I think probably that is more appropriately a question for Defense.

Q. Bob, can you say anything on the Japanese press report of B-52's from Okinawa flying patrols apparently along the Chinese-Korean coast with hydrogen bombs aboard?

A. No, I'm afraid I cannot. You might take that question up also with Defense.

ROGERS

END

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Drafted by: EA/P:RNKilpatrick:pap — 10/24/69
Tel. Ext. 22527
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/P - Mr. Neilson

Clearances:

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

XR DEF

SUBJECT: Alleged Nuclear B-52 Flights from Okinawa

REFS: A. Tokyo 8801 B. Tokyo 8813

1. In response to further press inquiries we suggest you reaffirm that it has been long standing policy of USG to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons in any particular location. Also, we do not discuss the operational activities of our strategic forces.

2. You may tell the GOJ privately and not for public release that there is no basis for the various assertions made in the Kyodo story. HICOM or CA may in confidence
/so inform Yara if appropriate.

(4)

3. With respect to your request for releases at time

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
PM/AE:WJLehmann:esr	10-24-69	23152	PM/AE - W.J.Lehman

CLEARANCES:
EA/J - Mr. Finn
DOD/ATSD(AE) - Dr. Walske
DOD/ISA - Mr. Doolin

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ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 JPM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03

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SUBJECT: NEWS STORY ON SYMINGTON STATEMENT

1. MAINICHI TODAY FRONT-PAGED STORY BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT UEDA ALLEGEDLY BASED ON STATEMENT MADE SUNDAY BY SENATOR SYMINGTON. HEADLINE IS QUOTE RYUKYU B-52 BASES NOT NEEDED NOW UNQUOTE AND STORY GOES ON INDICATE SYMINGTON CONSIDERS POLARIS SUBMARINES MAKE OKINAWABOMBER BASE UNNECESSARY. OTHER KEY POINTS IN STORY ARE: SYMINGTON STATEMENT FORESHADOWS MAJOR SCALING DOWN OF OVERSEAS BASES, WITH TOP PRIORIRTY TO JAPAN AND OKINAWA; MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S. BASES IN BOTH JAPAN AND OKINAWA WILL BE REDUCED DRASTICALLY IF U.S. CEASES COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OKINAWA; JAPAN SHOULD STEP UP ITS OWN MILITARYEFFORT AND PERHAPS JOIN PACIFIC COMMUNITY TO SHOULDER MILITARY BARDENS IN AREA; MILITARY VALUE OF U.S. BASES IN JAPAN MUST BE RE-STUDIED FROM POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW SINCE STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES HERE IS ONE SOURCE OF DISSATISFACTION WITH SECURITY TREATY.

2. COMMENT: IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNSCRAMBLE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF UEDA AND SYMINGTON TO THIS NEWS STORY. WOULD BE HELPFUL GET ACTUAL TEXT SYMINGTON STATEMENT IF AVAILABLE. OSBORN

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 06591 121253Z

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ACTION EA 15

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CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01,
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HICOMRY ALSO PASS ADCOM

SUBJ: REPORT OF RADICAL STUDENTS TRAVEL TO OKINAWA

REF: FJT-1549 1

BEGIN SUMMARY: POLICE CONFIRM MAINICHI NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT SOME RADICAL STUDENTS ENROUTE TO OKINAWA ABOARD TOKYO MARU. POLICE UNABLE TO VERIFY REPORTED STUDENT PLANS TO "INVADE" KADENA AIR BASE. END SUMMARY.

1. ENGLISH LANGUAGE MAINICHI DAILY NEWS REPORTED ON AUGUST 10 THAT SEVEN STUDENTS AFFILIATED WITH RADICAL CHUKAKUHA (NUCLEUS FACTION) DEPARTED TOKYO ON AUGUST 9 FOR OKINAWA VIA RYUKYU KAIUN K.K. OWNED TOKYO MARU. ARTICLE QUOTES ALLEGED POLICE REPORT THAT 56 STUDENTS AFFILIATED WITH RADICAL STUDENT FACTIONS HAVE DEPARTED FOR OKINAWA TO ATTEND ANTI-A AND H BOMB CONGRESS,

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AUGUST 13-15. ARTICLE REPORTS THAT STUDENTS CLAIM THEY WILL "INVADE" KADENA AIR BASE AUGUST 14 IN JOINT DEMONSTRATION WITH OKINAWAN STUDENTS.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, AUGUST 12, NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY OFFICIAL CONFIRMED GENERAL ACCURACY MAINICHI ARTICLE. POLICE RECOGNIZED FIVE RADICAL STUDENTS ON BOARD BUT UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THEM BY NAME. STUDENTS HAVE NECESSARY TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION. POLICE UNABLE TO VERIFY THAT STUDENTS PLANNING TO "INVADE" KADENA, BUT ADDED THAT RADICAL STUDENTS INVARIABLY BOAST IN ADVANCE OF PLANS TO "LIBERATE ESTABLISHMENT" FACILITIES.

3. CAS HAS SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED FROM POLICE (AND IS REPORTING SEPARATELY) THAT FORTY RADICAL STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY DEPARTED JAPAN FOR OKINAWA.

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MEYER

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 06037 231252Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
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SUB: OKINAWA: JULY 22 INTERPELLATIONS ON CBW

REF: TOKYO'S 5975

1. SUMMARY. PRESS HAS INTERPRETED REPLIES BY AICHI AND SATO IN DIET JULY 22 TO MEAN GOJ FORMALLY "REQUESTED" U.S. TO REMOVE CBW WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA AND HAS JUDGED GOJ'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CBW ISSUE AS MUCH STRONGER THAN THAT WITH RESPECT TO B-52'S. END SUMMARY.

2. PRIME MINISTER SATO WAS QUOTED INTER ALIA BY PRESS AS SAYING IN UPPER HOUSE LATE TUESDAY THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND WITH U.S. ON HANDLING OF CBW WEAPONS. HE REPORTEDLY ADDED JAPAN WOULD NEVER MAKE "SECRET DEAL" ANY MORE THAN IT WOULD WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. JSP DIETMAN TAKEDA ALLEGED THAT A U.S. ARMY

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UNIT IN SAGAMIHARA CITY MAY BE ENGAGED IN RESEARCH ON "GERM WARFARE". IN REPLY DEFENSE AGENCY DIRGEN KIICHI ARITA ROUNDLY DENIED U.S. ARMY WAS CONDUCTING CBW RESEARCH AND STATED THAT UNIT IN QUESTION WAS STUDYING DISEASES NATIVE TO JAPAN AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO DEMAND WITHDRAWAL. SATO ALSO SAID JAPAN WOULD SEEK BAN ON CBW WEAPONS IN GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE.

4. SUBSTANCE OF FONMIN AICHI'S REPLIES WAS AS CARRIED IN REFTEL BUT PRESS HAS INTERPRETED THEM AS CLEAR SIGN JAPAN HAD REQUESTED REMOVAL OF CBW WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA. PRESS AND TV COMMENTATORS HAVE UNIFORMLY STRESSED THAT GOJ ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN MUCH STRONGER THAN THAT SHOWN WITH RESPECT TO STATIONING OF B-52'S ON OKINAWA. EXEMPT. MEYER

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ACTION EA 15

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SUBJ: OKINAWA: REACTION TO CBW INCIDENT REPORTS

REFS: A. TOKYO 5944
B. TOKYO 5948

SUMMARY: WITH MOONWALK OVER, CBW INCIDENT HAS AGAIN RETURNED TO FRONT PAGES. APPEARING BEFORE DIET JULY 22, FONMIN AICHI CALLED FOR REMOVAL CBW'S FROM OKINAWA AT TIME OFREVERSION, BUT SIDE-

STEPPED QUESTION OF APPLYING PRIOR CONSULTATION CLAUSE TO CBW. END SUMMARY.

1. WITH ALL MZUIA ATTENTION FOCUSED ON APOLLO FLIGHT, JULY 21 PRESS COMMENTARY ON CBW INCIDENT SLACKENED SOMEWHAT. MOST PAPERS

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CARRIED IN BACK PAGES WASHINGTON STAR REPORT THAT US WOULD ASK FOR "EMERGENCY" USE OF OKINAWA FOR NUKES AND CBW'S AFTER REVERSION. SEVERAL FRONTPAGED AP STORY THAT NSC REEXAMINING OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT CBW'S AND CARTOONISTS CONTINUED THEIR FIELD DAY. HOWEVER, RETURN OF CBW ISSUE TO PROMINENT TREATMENT JULY 22 INDICATES THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE WITH US FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

2. JULY 22 PRESS REPORTED FONOFF ANNOUNCEMENT JULY 21 THAT US HAD ASSURED GOJ THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOT STORED IN JAPAN NOR DID US HAVE ANY INTENTION OF DOING SO, ALSO THAT THOROUGH SAFETY PRECAUTIONS CONTINUOUSLY IN EFFECT IN OKINAWA TO ENSURE NO RECURRENCE AND NO DANGER TO RESIDENTS. ASAHI REPORTED THAT IN CONSULTATIONS AMONG PRIMIN, FONMIN AND CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY, GOJ REACHED "UNIFIED POSITION" SAME DAY CALLING FOR REMOVAL CDF'S BEFORE REVERSION TAKES PLACE. MANY PRESS ACCOUNTS SPECULATED THAT GOJ WOULD ASK FOR IMMEDIATE REMOVAL CBW FROM OKINAWA.

3. FONMIN AICHI RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS IN LOWER HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA JULY 22 MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) USG HAD CONFIRMED THAT NO CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS WERE STORED IN JAPAN. IN OKINAWA, HE SAID, THE SUBSTANCE WAS NOT GAS BUT HE INDICATED THAT GOJ WOULD FURTHER REQUEST CLARIFICATION BY USG AS TO SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF SUBSTANCE INVOLVED. IF IT WERE CONFIRMED THAT THERE EXISTED ON OKINAWA SUCH "BARBAROUS" WEAPONS THE GOVERNMENT WOULD "NATURALLY" ASK FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

(B) CBW'S, BY NATURE, WERE NOT TYPE OF WEAPON WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER PRIOR CONSULTATION, RATHER, THE GOJ BELIEVED SUCH WEAPONS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED.

(C) CBW'S SHOULD "NATURALLY" BE REMOVED FROM OKINAWA AT THE TIME OF REVERSION.

(D) GOJ, CONSIDERING FEELINGS OF OKINAWANS, HAS URGED US TO EXERCISE "PRUDENCE" IN ITS DEPLOYMENT OF CBW'S IN OKINAWA AND REQUESTED USG TO TAKE THE SAME MEASURES FOR THE SAFETY OF OKINAWANS IT NOW TAKES IN JAPAN. AT PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING APPEARANCE BEFORE LOWER HOUSE COMMITTEE AICHI ALSO STATED THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH SECRETARY ROGERS WHEN SECRETARY VISITS JAPAN.
MEYER

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PAGE 01 211145Z

ACTION COPY

NAHA HICOMRY

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ACTION SS 10

INFO OCT 01 SSO 00 CCO 00 /011 W 049640

RED HAT

01 211120Z JUL 69
FM HICOMRY OKINAWA RYIS
TO DA
INFO AMEMB TOKYO
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S E C R E T
EXDIS
DA FOR OPS IA PASS TO STATE FOR FINN - HCRI-LN
SUBJ: RED HAT INCIDENT: CA/CE MEETING, 21 JUL 69
A. STATE 120400 (S) (NOTAL)
B. DA 2015112 JUL 69 (S)
1. (S) FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF SUCCESSFUL APOLLO 11 MOON WALK AND YARA COMMENTS ON ZENGUNRO REACTION TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION (SEPTEL) CE RAISED PROBLEM OF CURRENT REPORTS RE "GAS INCIDENT" FIRST REPORT IN U.S. PAPER AND WIDELY COVERED IN JAPANESE AND OKINAWA PRESS. SAID INCIDENT EXPECTED BECOME MAJOR PROBLEM AND NOTED SUCH GAS OUTLAWED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. ALLEGED

PAGE 2 RUAODADA 853 S E C R E T
PRESENCE HERE OF SUCH MATERIAL SOURCE OF GREATER ANXIETY THAN THAT CAUSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REPORTED LEGISLATURE NOW CONSIDERING RESOLUTION DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL. NOTED PRESS REPORTS THAT OKINAWA IS ONLY OVERSEAS STORAGE POINT FOR SUCH GAS. YARA REQUESTED CONFIRMATION LOCATION AND TYPE MATERIAL INVOLVED IN CURRENT REPORTS.
2. (S) IN REPLY CA GAVE SUBSTANCE PARA 6 REFTEL A IN DETAIL OMITTING PHRASE "PENDING ACTUAL REMOVAL". IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUERIES FROM CE, CA STATED HE WAS NOT ABLE TO GO BEYOND WHAT HE HAD SAID.
3. (S) CE THEN REFERRED TO INCIDENT LAST YEAR AT GUSHIKAWA BEACH INVOLVING UNEXPLAINED UKIN RASH. CA

(3)

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PAGE 02 211145Z

REPLIED HE FULLY AWARE OF GUSHIKAWA INCIDENT WHICH WAS SUBJECT THOROUGH USCAR-GRI INVESTIGATION WITH NO DEFINITE CAUSE DISCOVERED. CA STATED AS CE AND ON BEHALF PREFECTURAL PEOPLE HE HAD TO REQUEST REMOVAL OF GAS WEAPONS AS WELL AS B-52S. SAID HE PLANS MAKE SAME REQUEST IN MEETING WITH HICOM 22 JUL
GP-3

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. MORTON S/S-O.

[redacted]

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05948 201437Z

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ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ACDA-16 CIAE-00 JPM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-04 RSC-01 SP-02 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
RSR-01 /099 W ---------- 047095

O 201300Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7483
INFO DA IMMEDIATE
OASD
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SUBJ: OKINAWA-REACTION TO CBW INCIDENT REPORTS

REF: TOKYO 5944

1. SUMMARY: REACTION TO REPORTED CBW INCIDENT CONTINUED UNABATED WITH FIRST EDITORIALS EXPRESSING SHOCK OVER "DANGEROUS, INHUMANE" WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AND REPROACHING USG FOR SILENCE. STORIES HIGHLIGHTED GROWING REACTION ON OKINAWA ("EXCEEDS B-52 CRASH"), CONSIDERABLE FEELING WITHIN LDP THAT GOJ SHOULD SOMEHOW ASK U.S. TO REMOVE CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA, AND DEBATE OVER WHETHER APLICATION OF PRIOR CONSULTATION CLAUSE UNDER SECURITY TREATY IS BEST WAY TO EXCLUDE CBW AGENTS FROM JAPANESE SOIL. END SUMMARY.

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2. JULY 20 EDITIONS OF ALL SIX MAJOR DAILIES CONTINUE TO GIVE TOP BILLING AND EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO NEWS OF CBW INCIDENT. ALL PAPERS CARRIED HARD HITTING EDITORIALS. MAJOR THEMES INCLUDED UNIVERSAL EXPRESSIONS OF SHOCK, UNEASE OVER USG SILENCE, PROTESTS AGAINST CBW AGENTS ON OKINAWA AND DEMANDS FOR REMOVAL. CARTOONISTS HAD HEYDAY LINKING APOLLO SHOT WITH GAS INCIDENT. ASAHI DEPICTED IN FRONT PAGE CARTOON CLOUD OF "VX GAS" RISING FROM OKINAWA AND ONLOOKING SPACE CAPSULE DECLARING, "MY NAME HAS BEEN SLANDERED."

3. EDITORIALS CALLED FOR GOJ TO CLOSE "LOOPHOLE" THAT, UNDER PRESENT INTERPRETATION OF SECURITY TREATY, COULD ALLOW INTRODUCTION OF CBW INTO JAPAN. ALTHOUGH WRITERS AGREED THAT CBW'S ARE PROBABLY OUTSIDE PURVIEW OF PRIOR CONSULTATION CLAUSE, MOST URGED GOJ TO SECURE USG UNDERSTANDING THAT INTRODUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS SHOULD REQUIRE PRIOR GOJ APPROVAL AS "MAJOR CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT OF US FORCES." CONCERN WAS ALSO EXPRESSED THAT CONTINUED PRESENCE OF CBW ON OKINAWA WOULD BECOME OBSTACLE TO REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS. SANKEI SHIMBUN CAUTIONED THAT SHOULD CBW REMAIN IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION, MAJOR POLITICAL TURMOIL WOULD BE TOUCHED OFF.

4. MOST EDITORIALS TRACED HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FROM FIRST WORLD WAR TO RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN US. NOTING GROWING FEELING IN AMERICA THAT STRICTER CONTROLS SHOULD BE EXERCISED OVER THESE WEAPONS, WRITERS SPECULATED THAT OKINAWA INCIDENT SHOULD HAVE DEEP IMPACT IN US AND INTERNATIONALLY. PAPERS POINTED OUT THAT NEITHER USG NOR GOJ HAD RATIFIED 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL BANNING USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN WARFARE AND URGED GOJ, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF PRESENT DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA ON SUBJECT, TO RECONSIDER POSITION. ASAHI EDITORIAL EVEN RAISED SPECTRE OF RACIAL PREJUDICE, CLAIMING THAT GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY IN EUROPE IS TO AVOID USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ASIAN PEOPLE, HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE HESITATION IN USING NUCLEAR ARMS, OR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, ASAHI ASSERTED.

5. CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY HORI REPORTEDLY LIMITED HIMSELF TO TIGHTLIPPED "AS SOON AS WE FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED, WE WILL DECIDE THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE" IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONING ON JULY 19. HOWEVER, LDP DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL SUSUMU NIKAIDO (SATO FACTION) REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESS SAME DAY THAT GOJ SHOULD REQUEST US TO REMOVE CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA IF, IN FACT, THEY WERE STORED THERE. NIKAIDO SAID PEOPLE'S WELFARE WAS AFFECTED AND THAT

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LDP HAD ASKED FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONDUCT IMMEDIATE INQUIRY INTO MATTER. PRESS ALSO REPORTED MOUNTING OPINION IN RULING LDP THAT CBW AGENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY TREATY ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS AS "MAJOR CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT" AND THAT GOJ SHOULD SEEK US UNDERSTANDING ON THIS MATTER.

6. ACCORDING TO LEAD TOKYO SHIMBUN AND ASAHI NEWS REPORTS, FONOFF JUNE 19 HAD REACHED TENTATIVE VIEW THAT IF PRESENCE CBW IN OKINAWA WERE CONFIRMED FONOFF COULD NOT LEGALLY REQUEST ITS REMOVAL FROM USG ADMINISTERED ISLANDS BUT WOULD (IN SAME FASHION IT HANDLED B-52 CRASH LAST JANUARY) URGE USG TO ACT WITH PRUDENCE TO AMELIORATE UNEASINESS IN OKINAWA. ARTICLE SAID FONOFF HELD THAT NEITHER NUCLEAR NOR "POISON GAS" WEAPONS SHOULD REMAIN IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. TOKYO SHIMBUN SAID GOJ WOULD REACH "UNIFIED OPINION" ON CBW ISSUE ON JULY 21 IN ORDER PREPARE FOR OPPOSITION ONSLAUGHT IN DIET INTERPELLATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR CONSULTATIONS, IT QUOTED FOREIGN MINISTRY "WORKING LEVEL AUTHORITIES" VIEW THAT JAPANESE PEOPLE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT CBW AGENTS IN JAPAN. THEREFORE, SECURITY TREATY'S PROCEDURE FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS IS NOT NECESSARILY PROPER APPROACH. SOURCE SAID SEPARATE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND JAPAN NOT TO BRING IN CBW AGENTS WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. SAME ARTICLE ALSO WENT BEYOND SPECULATION IN YESTERDAY'S PRESS ABOUT JAPAN'S POSSIBLE ADHERANCE TO GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 TO SUGGEST GOJ WOULD PROBABLY BACK BRITISH CBW DRAFT IN GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE.

7. TOKYO PRESS CONTINUED TO GIVE HEAVY PLAY TO REPORTS EMANATING FROM NAHA CORRESPONDENTS THAT STRESSED MOOD OF SHOCK AND ANGER AMONG RYUKYUANS. "MAINICHI" HEADLINED THAT OKINAWA REACTION EXCEEDED THAT AGAINST B-52 CRASH. SEVERAL REPORTS INDICATED OKINAWANS OF ALL STRIPES RESENTFUL OF SILENCE OF US AUTHORITIES WITH RESPECT TO CBW QUESTION AND PLACED EXPECTATIONS ON CE YARA'S JULY 21 AND JULY 22 MEETINGS WITH CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR AND HICOM, RESPECTIVELY.

8. STORIES ALSO OUTLINE OKINAWA GENSUIKYO (ANTI-A&H BOMB COUNCIL) SPECULATION ABOUT SITES WHERE CBW "RESEARCH" BEING CONDUCTED, MENTIONING CHIBANA NEAR ZUKERAN AND ALSO TYING IN "RADIATION STUDIES" (THE "R" OF CBR, AS PRESS PUT IT) WITH SITES. REPORTS SUGGEST, WITHOUT SPECIFICS, THAT "PROGRESSIVE" ORGANIZATIONS GEARING UP FOR PROTESTS AND THAT EFFORTS BEING MADE TO REACTIVATE "ASSOCIATION TO PROTECT PEOPLE'S LIVES" (SEIMEI O MAMORU KAI), AN

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PAGE 04 TOKYO 05948 201437Z

UMBRELLA "STRUGGLE" ORGANIZATION MORIBUND SINCE FAILURE OF FEBRUARY 4'S ABORTIVE GENERAL STRIKE. STORIES ABOUT POTENTIAL PROTEST MOVEMENTS ON ISLANDS ALSO SUGGEST RELATION TO POSSIBLE "SECOND WAVE" ZENGUNRO STRIKE AT END OF JULY, BUT NOTE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN ZENGUNRO. MEYER
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05944 01 OF 02 191116Z

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ACTION EA-15

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IO-13 ACDA-16 JPM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-10 P-04 RSC-01 SP-02
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SUB: OKINAWA - REACTION TO CBW INCIDENT REPORTS

1. SUMMARY: ENORMOUS PUBLIC REACTION TO WALL STREET JOURNAL STORY ABOUT OKINAWA CBW INCIDENT RELEGATED APOLLO TO SECONDARY MEDIA TREATMENT, BROUGHT ON ODIOUS COMPARISONS WITH JANUARY B-52 CRASH AT KADENA, AND RAISED PRESS QUESTIONING ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS TO CBW AGENTS AND EFFECTS ON OKINAWA NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. PRESS RADIO AND TV GAVE OKINAWA CBW STORY TOP BILLING JULY 19. TOP STORY FOR ALL PAPERS, ALL BUT ONE OF SIX MAJOR DAILIES GAVE OVER MOVE THAN HALF FRONT PAGE (WITH CONSIDERABLE SPILLAGE ONTO OTHER PAGES) TO INCIDENT, RELEGATING TO SECONDARY BILLING APOLLO FLIGHT WHICH ALL JAPANESE HAVE FOLLOWED WITH GREAT SYMPATHY AND EXPECTATION.

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STORIES PLAYED IN JUXTAPOSITION TO MUCH SMALLER ARTICLE ON ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF SPARROW MISSILE BY USAF JET OVER UNINHABITED AREA OF GIFU PREFECTURE.

3. BANNER HEADLINES AND STREAMERS READ "POISON GAS RELEASED ON OKINAWA," "24 TO HOSPITAL," "DIET ARGUMENT SEEN OVER PRIOR CONSULTATIONS," "MOST TOXIC VX NERVE GAS," "YARA SAYS OKINAWA IS WORLD'S WORST BASE," AND SO ON.

4. REPORTS ABOUT DETAILS OF INCIDENT ITSELF LIMITED TO WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT, BOTH REPORTED IN FULL. MAINICHI CARRIED PROMINENTLY PICTURE OF DUGWAY SHEEP, AND ALL PAPERS CARRIED ANALYSIS OF TOXIC PROPERTIES OF VX AND OTHER NERVE GASES. MEDIA PROMINENTLY FEATURED STORIES ON EARLIER DEBATES IN U.S. OVER TRANSPORTATION AND DISPOSAL OF CBW AGENTS. AFTERNOON PRESS AND RADIO AND TV BROADCASTS GAVE EXTENSIVE PLAY TO STATEMENTS IN U.S. CONGRESS OF SENATOR NELSON AND REPRESENTATIVE RUESS CALLING FOR INVESTIGATION, FEATURING PROMINENTLY SENATOR NELSON'S STATEMENT SAYING INCIDENT RAISES "GRAVE MORAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS."

5. PRESS ACCOUNTS OF GOJ REACTION TO STORY DEALT MAINLY WITH TOGO-OSBORN MEETING AFTERNOON JULY 18 IN WHICH PRESS SAID FORMER REQUESTED U.S. TO MAKE INVESTIGATION INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT AND "TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ENSURE SAFETY OF LOCAL RESIDENTS." SPECULATIVE PIECES ALLEGE FONMIN AICHI AND OTHERS IN FONOFF CONCERNED ABOUT REACTION OF OKINAWANS AND ADVERSE EFFECT INCIDENT MAY HAVE ON REVERSION TALKS, PARTICULARLY ON INTERPRETATION OF PRIOR CONSULTATION CLAUSE. DEFENSE AGENCY OFFICIALS, AFTER MAKING EMBARRASSING ADMISSION THAT AGENCY KNEW NOTHING WHATEVER OF INCIDENT RAISED FURTHER SPECULATION BY ADDING, REPORTEDLY, THAT THEY COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WERE NOT NOW STORED IN JAPAN ITSELF; HENCE, THAT HOMELAND LEVEL REVERSION WOULD NOT MEAN AUTOMATIC REMOVAL THESE WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA.

6. PRESS COMMENTARY FOCUSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ON EFFECTS ON OKINAWA NEGOTIATIONS, SPECULATING THAT GOJ, WHICH IN PRESS'S JUDGMENT DID NOT WANT TO TAKE POSITION ON WHETHER

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CBW AGENTS CAME UNDER PRIOR CONSULTATION PROVISIONS OF SECURITY TREATY, WOULD NOW HAVE TO REACH "UNIFIED OPINION" OF APPLICABILITY OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS TO CBW AGENTS. COMMENTATORS NOTED THAT PRIOR CONSULTATIONS, IN SO FAR AS STATIONING OF WEAPONS WAS CONCERNED, HAD HITHERTO BEEN LIMITED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THAT VIEW OF MANY EXPERTS WAS THAT CBW AGENTS WERE "WORSE THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS." INTERPRETATIVE COLUMNS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT GOJ WOULD NOW PUSH HARD IN GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE FOR PROHIBITIONS ON CBW AGENTS. MEYER

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05944 02 OF 02 191126Z

12
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 SCI-05
IO-13 ACDA-16 JPM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-10 P-04 RSC-01 SP-02
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7. TOKYO PRESS HAS GIVEN ALMOST AS MUCH ATTENTION TO REACTION ON OKINAWA, AS REPORTED BY NAHA CORRESPONDENTS, AS TO STORY ITSELF. GENERAL TENOR THESE ACCOUNTS IS THAT "SHOCK" THIS HAS CAUSED LOCALLY WILL ADD MUCH FUEL TO GROWING ANTI-BASE FEELING IN OKINAWA AND ASAHI CORRESPONDENT STATES THAT REACTION IS NO LESS SEVERE THAN THAT FOLLOWING B-52 CRASH LAST NOVEMBER. VIRTUALLY ALL ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT NERVE GAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR MASS SKIN INFECTIONS AND TEN-LEGGED FROG SENSATION LAST YEAR. MOST ACCOUNTS ARE IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF REPORTED "NO COMMENT" ATTITUDE OF LOCAL MILITARY SPOKESMEN IN FACE OF WIDE-SPREAD CONCERN. C.E. YARA REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD PRESS THAT CBW MUST BE ADDED TO NUKES, B-52S AND SSN'S IN CATALOG OF UNACCEPTABLE MILITARY HARDWARE. STORIES ALSO STATE THAT PROTEST RESOLUTION BY RYUKYU LEGISLATURE INEVITABLE.

8. IN ADDITION TO GRABBING HEADLINES FROM APOLLO 11, NERVE GAS STORY HAS PUSHED INTO BACKGROUND HICOM'S JULY 18 ANNOUNCEMENT OF ZENGUNRO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES. MOST PAPERS CARRIED BRIEF GIST OF MEASURES ANNOUNCED ALONG WITH REPORT OF SCHEDULED ZENGUNRO MEETING TO CONSIDER

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FURTHER STRIKE ACTION. HOWEVER, SOME STORIES FILED IN NAHA OMINOUSLY SUGGEST THAT NERVE GAS STORY WILL COMPEL MODERATE UNIONISTS TO ADOPT MUCH STRONGER NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THAN WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN THE CASE.

9. ALLL OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING KOMEITO AND MODERATE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS, IMMEDIATELY URGED HARASSED GOJ TO DEMAND THAT U.S. WITHDRAW ANY AND ALL STOCKS OF CBW WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA. JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY CABLED UN SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT AND CHAIRMAN OF GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DEMANDING U.S. BE FORCED TO REMOVE CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA. ALL PARTIES STRESSED PLANS TO INITIATE EMERGENCY" INTERROGATION OF GOJ IN DIET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, RAISING PROSPECT THAT ALREADY TROUBLED DIET WILL SEE ADDITIONAL HEAT GENERATED ON THIS ISSUE.

10. REPRESENTATIVES OF FIVE PROTEST GROUPS CALLED AT EMBASSY JUNE 19 AND WE EXPECT RASH OF PROTESTS WHEN OFFICIAL WORK HOURS BEGIN AGAIN AFTER APOLLO DAY OF PARTICIPATION. RADICAL, LEFT-OF-JCP STUDENT GROUPS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH CAMPUS STRUGGLES TO EXCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER RADICAL STUDENTS, HITHERTO POINTING TOWARD ALL OUT DEMOS AGAINST PRIME MINISTER SATO'S PROJECTED NOVEMBER DEPARTURE FOR U.S. WILL RENEW DEMO ACTIVITY AGAINST U.S. PRESENCE.
MEYER

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 06922 221148Z

44
ACTION EA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 JPM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-04
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SUBJ: GOJ ISSUES STATEMENT ON CBW

REFS: A. TOKYO 5944; B. TOKYO 5948; C. TOKYO 5975;

1. AUGUST 22 CABINET MEETING APPROVED ISSUANCE OF GOJ STATEMENT ON CBW AGENTS. STATEMENT, IN FORM OF REPLY TO QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED DURING LAST SESSION OF DIET BY JSP LOWER HOUSE MEMBER YANOSUKE NAKAZAKI, (1) EXPRESSES TRUST IN USG JULY 20 AND 22 DECLARATIONS THAT NO LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN JAPAN PROPER, (2) ASSERT NO U.S. R&D FACILITIES IN JAPAN CONNECTED WITH LETHAL CBW AND (3) DECLARES THAT WHILE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES NEITHER POSSESS NOR ARE ENGAGED R&D ON CBW WEAPONS, SDF IS UNDERTAKING R&D ON DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. REPLY SIDESTEPS ANSWER TO WHETHER U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN HAVE NON-LETHAL CBW AGENTS.

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2. COMMENT: GOJ APPARENTLY DELIBERATELY DELAYED REPLY UNTIL DIET SESSION ENDED AND PRESS INTEREST IN ISSUE HAD SOMEWHAT SUBSIDED. MEYER

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138302

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

INFO: HICOMRY
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions

1. During recent Tokyo visit, Fonoff asked Finn when we planned to complete announced withdrawal chemical munitions from Okinawa.

2. FYI Plans to implement withdrawal still under consideration here and we unable to estimate at this time when removal will begin or be completed. We will try to have something you can pass to GOJ ASAP. XXXX

END

JOHNSON

3

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/J:HMMcElroy:bd 8/15/69	23152	EA/J - Richard B. Finn RBF

Clearances: DOD/ISA - Miss Truex (draft)
DA/ODUSA/IA - Col. Pilk (subs)
S/S - Mr. Brown

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Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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DEF 15 RYU
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
HICOMRY Naha
CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD Honolulu

Excerpts from press briefing ~~paper~~ August 6, 1969 follow: BEGIN TEXT.

13174

Q. Do you have any information or has there been any request for information from the Japanese Government on 50 ~~xxxxxx~~ containers of nerve gas that is reported missing in Okinawa?

A. We have a brief report on that. It's not correct that it's nerve gas. We understand that it is tear gas. And there's been a public announcement by -- of this by our ~~xxx~~people in Okinawa.

Q. Is there a copy of that available here?

A. I can get it for you.

RICHARDSO

(4)

Drafted by: EA/P:RKilpatrick:pap 8/6/69
Tel. Ext. 22527
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/P - Mr. Simpson
Clearances:

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 352

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 05030 270652Z

11
ACTION EA 15

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INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,RSR 01,
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O 270643Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 834

UNCLAS DJAKARTA 5030

SECTO 14

FOR EA - AMB BROWN FROM DUEMLING

PLEASE SEND TEXT OF INITIAL DOD ANNOUNCEMENT ON REMOVAL CW WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA PLUS ANY SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT SAME SUBJECT. TEXTS SHOULD ARRIVE PRIOR SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE FOR TOKYO. MANY THANKS.
ROGERS
BT

(2)

NNN

Djakarta 5030
7-27-69

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Authority NND969000
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DEF 12 US
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy TOKYO
MANILA
BONN

TOSEC 100

REF: DJAKARTA 5030

Following is the text of DOD press release re CW munitions on Okinawa issued July 22:

Defense
The Department of ~~Defense~~ said today that preparations are being made to remove certain chemical munitions, including some toxic agents, which were moved to Okinawa several years ago as a result of decisions made in 1961 and 1963.

It has been previously announced that at the request of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, the President ordered the National Security Countil this spring to initiate a comprehensive study of chemical and biological warfare matters, including overseas deployment.

No toxic chemical agents have been deployed overseas since Secretary Laird took office.

The public release of certain information about a mishap on Okinawa was delayed temporarily pending notification to the Government of Japan. This notification has been accomplished and it is now possible to report as follows:

On July 8, twenty three U.S. Army soldiers and an American civilian employed of the U.S Army were exposed briefly to the chemical agent, GB, on Okinawa. No personnel were seriously affected. After precautionary medical obsevation, including brief hospitalization of four military personnel, all 24 persons were returned to full duty within six hours. There were no Ryukyuans or other non-U.S. nationals involved.

124683

OK RNL

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Gleysteen
RPEvers:rpm		

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EA/J - Mr. ~~Straus~~

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7583

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6100

EXDIS

SUB: OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT

REF: TOKYO S 6054

BEGIN SUMMARY: WHILE GENERALLY PLEASED WITH WAY INCIDENT HAS BEEN HANDLED, FONMIN AICHI WAS, IN OPINION OF AMERICAN BUREAU DIRECTOR TOGO, SERIOUSLY DISTURBED BY INCLUSION IN DOD ANNOUNCEMENT OF STATEMENT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HELD UP PENDING NOTIFICATION JAPAN, WHEREAS IN FACT HE FIRST LEARNED IDENTIFY OF CHEMICAL FROM PUBLIC MEDIA. END SUMMARY

1. TOGO CALLED DCM TO FONOFF JULY 24 ON ANOTHER MATTER, AND DCM TOOK OCCASION TO REVIEW FOR HIM AND HIS DEPUTY, OKAWARA, POINTS IN PARA TWO OF STATE'S 122173, AND TO SAY THAT, GIVEN REGRETTABLE FACT OF INCIDENT, HE FELT U.S. HAD BEHAVED IN VIRTUALLY EXEMPLARY MANNER. THANKS TO THIS AND TO DEFT GOJ COOPERATION, IT SEEMED WE WERE IN ABOUT AS GOOD POSITION AS WE COULD HAVE HOPED TO BE.

2. FONOFF REPS AGREED THAT FROM STANDPOINT OF RESULTS ACHIEVED, WE HAD HANDLED INCIDENT WELL. THEY DID NOT SEEM VERY ENTHUSIASTIC, HOWEVER, AND ON FURTHER PROBING THEY SAID FONMIN AICHI HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY DISTURBED ON LEARNING FOR FIRST TIME VIA PUBLIC DOD ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CHEMICAL WAS SOMETHING CALLED "GB", AND THAT DOD ANNOUNCEMENT HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN HELD UP PENDING NOTIFICATION OF JAPAN. FONMIN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED LEST HE BE QUIZZED ON THIS ASPECT IN DIET. AS IT TURNED OUT, DIET QUESTIONING DID NOT TAKE THIS TACK, SO SERIOUSNESS OF AICHI'S CONCERN HAD SLACKED OFF, BUT MATTER STILL RANKLED.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 06100 251033Z

3. POINTING OUT THAT JAPAN IS NOT ONLY COUNTRY WITH ACTIVE, AGGRESSIVE FREE PRESS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION, DCM SAID GOJ SHOULD UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE FACT THAT THERE WAS CLEARANCE PROCESS TO BE GONE THROUGH, AND THAT IN AUTHORIZING RELEASE IN CONFIDENCE OF INFORMATION THAT WAS PASSED TO TOGO, WASHINGTON HAD BEEN AS FORTHCOMING AS IT POSSIBLY COULD.

4. TOGO AND OKAWARA SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD, AND REITERATED OPINION THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS AND IN OVERALL INCIDENT HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY HANDLED. GP-3

MEYER

[redacted]

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Tokyo 6054 7-24-69

CONFIDENTIAL 408

PAGE 01 TOKYO 06054 240748Z

16
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00 /071 W 070497

P R 240650Z JULY 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7549
INFO HICOMRY OKINAWA
CINCPAC HAWAII

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6054

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT

REF: STATE 122173

BEGIN SUMMARY: GOJ IS WELL-PLEASED WITH WAY US HANDLED THIS INCIDENT, SAYS PARLIAMENTARY VICE MINISTER FON AFFAIRS; INDEED, HE SAYS, (MISTAKEN) IMPRESSION THAT DECISION REMOVE MUNITIONS RESULTED FROM GOJ REPRESENTATIONS CONSTITUTED HEARTENING DEMONSTRATION OF US WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE ALLY'S WISHES. INITIAL REPORTS OF FONOFF DISPLEASURE APPARENTLY EXAGGERAYED. END SUMMARY.

1. DCM SAW FORN AFFAIRS PARLIAMENTARY VICE MINISTER ROKUSUKE TANAKA AT LUNCH JULY 24 WITH INTENTION CONVEYING TO HIM POINTS IN PARA TWO REFTEL. TANAKA, WITHOUT DCM HAVING TO RAISE SUBJECT, BEGAN CONVERSATION WITH EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR MANNER IN WHICH US HAD HANDLED SUBJECT INCIDENT. HE SAID "ONCE INCIDENT HAD BEEN DISCLOSED, U.S. PROCEEDED TO DO EXACTLY THE RIGHT THINGS".

2. WITH REFERENCE TO REPORTED UNHAPPINESS IN FONOFF OVER HANDLING OF ANNOUNCEMENT, TANAKA SAID GIVEN NATURE OF INCIDENT, THERE BOUND TO BE SOME HEADACHES; HOWEVER, HE INSISTED OVERALL ATTITUDE IN GOJ LEADERSHIP AT THIS TIME IS ONE OF SATISFACTION. HE HAD JUST COME FROM MEETINGS WITH PM SATO AND OHIRA (MITI) AND HE COULD REPORT THAT THEY DID NOT SHOW AND BAD FEELING ABOUT INCIDENT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, TANAKA SAID THIS MIGHT EVEN BE REGARD-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 06054 240748Z

ED AS EXAMPLE OF "TURNING ADVERSITY INTO GOOD FORTUNE"; AFFAIR HAD PROVIDED MOST HEARTENING DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE WISHES OF GOJ AND RESPECT FEELINGS OF JAPANESE NATION.

3. LEST IMPRESSION BE ALLOWED TO STAND THAT USG HAD ACTED IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURES GENERATED BY INCIDENT, DCM STRONGLY EMPHASIZED FACT THAT BASIC REMOVAL DECISION TAKEN WELL IN ADVANCE OF INCIDENT ITSELF, LET ALONE ITS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. DCM ALSO REVIEWED ALL POINTS IN PARA TWO REFTEL, AND ASKED TANAKA TO DO HIS BEST TO HELP SPREAD UNDERSTANDING OF THEM WITHIN FONOFF AND LDP LEADERSHIP. TANAKA SAID HE WOULD.

4. COMMENT: TANAKA IS NOT GIVEN TO UNDERSTATEMENT, AND HIS REMARKS SHOULD BE TAKEN AT SOME DISCOUNT. NEVERTHELESS, HE IS VERY CLOSE TO OHIRA AND FAIRLY CLOSE TO PRIMIN SATO, AND THERE WAS NO MISTAKING SPONTANEITY AND SINCERITY OF HIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR OVERALL US HANDLING OF THIS INCIDENT. WE WILL OF COURSE SEEK OCCASIONS TO CONVEY SAME POINTS TO TOGO AND OTHERS IN FONOFF. AS PARA ONE REFTEL SAYS, WE DO HAVE SOME REPAIR WORK LEFT TO DO; HOWEVER, AS OF NOW WE WOULD JUDGE THAT EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO AICHI'S AND FONOFF'S SENSIBILITIES WAS OVERSTATED BY CHIBA IN HIS INITIAL COMMENTS TO POL COUNS (TOKYO'S 6017). GP-3.
MEYER

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
Naha
HICOMRY
CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD Honolulu

Excerpts from press briefing July 25, 1969 follow: BEGIN TEXT.

Q. Do you have any comment on the student rioting in Okinawa?

A. In Okinawa? Nothing, really, beyond what you've seen on the news-agency tickers. I have some rundown, but I think in general it's about the same; it's been reported out there. We've had some preliminary reports from Okinawa and, according to these reports, about 65 students, members of a radical student organization, demonstrated in front of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus office building on the afternoon of July 25, Okinawa time. They were carrying several banners which expressed opposition to the presence of U.S. bases and chemical munitions on Okinawa. Several students lowered the U.S. flag which was flying in front of the building and stepped on it. Military policemen raised the flag later without any interference. The government of the islands police arrived on the scene and the

(4)

Drafted by: EA/P:RNKilpatrick:pap | 7/25/69 | Tel. Ext. 5360 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/P - Mr. Simpson

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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48

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Note - 560

July 25, 1969

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Okinawa/Japan: Nerve Gas Incident Causes Furor

Strong reaction in Japan and Okinawa to an article in the Wall Street Journal about an incident on a US base in Okinawa in which 25 Americans were injured by nerve gas will have serious repercussions on our relations with Japanese. The Foreign Minister will probably raise the CBW issue at the US-Japan Joint Cabinet Conference which opens in Tokyo on July 29 and may introduce it into the negotiations on Okinawa. It will have the effect of stiffening the Japanese position on the status of US bases after reversion. Japan is also likely to support actively international efforts to ban the use of CBW.

In Japan, demonstrations linking the CBW issue to opposition demands for removal of B-52s from Okinawa may occur but are not likely to be violent or large. The incident will not lead to a united front of the divided opposition parties, but it does give them a common target and it has raised the general level of tension to the point where further incidents could lead to serious demonstrations. The major danger comes from the press, where coverage of the incident and its aftermath remains heavy, and is likely to continue to keep the government under pressure until the US actually removes CBW agents from Okinawa.

In Okinawa, the incident will fan reversionist and anti-American sentiment. The opposition there also will attempt to use the gas incident to revive its campaign

Dpf 15 Ryu Ja-US XR Pol JAPAN-US Dpf 12 US Dpf 18

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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against the presence of B-52s and alleged radioactive "contamination" from nuclear submarine visits, making the possibility of strikes and violence greater than in Japan.

The incident has undercut the impact on the Japanese public of the Apollo 11 flight. In the longer run its most serious damage may be to the US image in Japan, where many will see the US as a technically superior nation ready to use "barbaric" weapons, especially on Asians. Racial feeling of this sort has already appeared in two editorials in the most influential newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun.

Nerve Gas Scare and the Security Treaty. When US statements did not deny that nerve gas had been involved in the July 8 incident, the Japanese press concluded that it was in fact on the island. When Japanese officials admitted that the US-Japan Security Treaty did not bar the US from bringing CBW agents into Japan and that they did not know whether or not the US had done so, the press demanded an agreement that would exclude CBW agents from both Japan and Okinawa. The US unilateral decision to withdraw CBW materials from Okinawa will blunt this campaign but nothing short of an agreement not to reintroduce CBW will remove the issue entirely.

A government spokesmen told the press on July 21 that the GOJ /"do something would to correct the situation" if indeed hazardous American war materials were stored in Okinawa. The next day Foreign Minister Aichi told the press he would raise the question during Secretary Rogers' Tokyo visit at the end of the month. He also told a Diet committee that the government would ask the US to remove "barbarous" CBW weapons from Okinawa, if they were in fact there, and that they "naturally" should be removed at the time of reversion. He said VX gas had not been involved in the Okinawan incident. The next day he told Dietmen that contrary to press reports, the deadly VX gas was not involved in the incident, though the less lethal GB gas was.

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Japanese Position On "Free Use" May Be Tougher. Careful distinctions between VX and GB gases are likely to be lost on the Japanese public. US assurances that CBW agents are not stored in Japan and will be removed from Okinawa will moderate popular feelings, but they will not stop the press and opposition parties from continuing to pressure the government to get from the US an agreement which will ban the introduction of these agents and plug what they call the CBW "loophole" in the Security Treaty. This pressure will make it more difficult for the Japanese government to accede to "free use" of US bases in Okinawa after reversion.

Nerve Gas Still a Dangerous Issue in Okinawa. Although the US announcement that it will remove CBW materials may assuage some of the popular fear of contamination, the July 8 incident and the danger it implies to the Okinawans will continue to fan reversionist feeling and to keep tension high on the island. The Okinawan legislature, including conservative members, has passed a strongly-worded resolution calling for the removal of CBW materials. Until the materials are removed, the CBW issue, like removal of B-52s and reversion itself, will be supported by all parts of the body politic. The base employees union (Zungunro) has tentatively called for strike (action against dismissal policy) at the end of this month or in early August. That strike and the tension caused by the July 8 nerve gas incident may lead to a revival of the general strike which was called off at the eleventh hour last February. None of the issues in that abortive strike, including a protest against nuclear submarine visits and a proposed new labor law, has been resolved.

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Tabeyr 4130
7-26-69

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 06130 260701Z

16
ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01 CIAE 00 /071 W 088179

P R 260545Z JUL 69
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6130

LIMDIS

DJAKARTA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT

REF: TOKYO 6054

1. AT MEETING WITH FONMIN AICHI JULY 26 ON ANOTHER MATTER (SEPTEL), HE EXPRESSED WITHOUT RESERVATION HIS APPRECIATION AND THAT OF GOJ FOR WAY IN WHICH U.S. HAD HANDLED OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT. HE ALSO REFERRED TO INCIDENT OF JULY 25 IN WHICH RADICAL STUDENTS ATTACKED USCAR HEADQUARTERS AND MUTILATED U.S. FLAG, AND EXPRESSED HIS REGRET. EVEN THOUGH, AS HE POINTED OUT, OCCURRENCE WAS IN AREA OUTSIDE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF GOJ.

2. IN ACCEPTING AICHI'S EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR HANDLING OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT AND IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR GOJ COOPERATION IN THAT REGARD, I URGED THAT ON SUCH MATTERS WE MUST TAKE SOPHISTICATED APPROACH. CHEMICAL WEAPONRY DOES EXIST, I SAID, AND NONE OF US LIKE IT. BUT IT WOULD IRRESPONSIBLE FOR ANY GOVERNMENT TO BE OSTRICH-LIKE. TROUBLE IS THAT AS OPEN SOCIETY, U.S. ACTIVITIES USUALLY BECOME KNOW AND VULNERABLE TO HERD-LIKE PUBLIC REVULSION. NOTING SOVIETS ABLE TO SEND LUNA 15 TO MOON AND STILL TODAY NO ONE KNOWS PURPOSE, I SUGGESTED NO ONE CAN IGNORE POSSIBILITY OTHER NATIONS DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONRY. IT THUS BEHOOVES USG TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THIS MATTER

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 06130 260701Z

UNDER REVIEW, CARRY ON PRUDENT RESEARCH, AND, IF NECESSARY, MAINTAIN LIMITED DETERRENT CAPABILITY. GOJ, I SAID, SHOULD SHOW SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING.

3. THIS PROMPTED AICHI TO REFER TO 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND PRESENT GENEVA MEETINGS ON DISARMAMENT. HE SAID HE WISHES TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH ASAKAI WHEN HE NEXT COMES TO TOKYO AND WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH USG. THIS AFFORDED ME OCCASION TO EMPHASIZE THAT SUBJECTS BEING DISCUSSED AT GENEVA ARE SERIOUS MATTER FOR US, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ADEQUATE INSPECTIONS MAY BE POSSIBLE IN U.S. BUT NOT RPT NOT ELSEWHERE. THEREFORE, WE VERY MUCH HOPE GOJ WILL STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US RE VARIOUS ITEMS ON ENDC AGENDA. AICHI ASSURED THIS WOULD BE HIS POLICY. GP-3.
MEYER

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY

INFO: HICOMRY Naha
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STATE
LIMDIS
SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions Incident

REF: Tokyo 6017 - DEF 15 RYU JS - US

1. Agree that we have some repair work left to do in aftermath this episode but we unhappy at Chiba's agitated and pushy attitude.

2. Believe following points might be made to Japanese, at least at Togo level, as part of repair job: (a) Osborn told Togo at noon July 20 (Tokyo's 5947) that decision made to remove lethal stocks from Okinawa and that it possible this decision would be given press early this week. (b) Osborn at same time told Togo material involved was not VX as reported by Wall Street Journal even though we were not able tell Japanese at that point

122173

(2)

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
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ACTION: TOKYO

material was GB. (c) We were not able give Japanese press announcement in advance since text not finalized till shortly before Secretary saw Amb. Shimoda July 22. (d) Department gave Japanese Embassy here copy of DOD announcement shortly after it was issued on July 22. (e) U.S. decision and announcement of withdrawal were made rapidly, and we tried at all stages to keep GOJ informed of developments. (f) We appreciate helpful public posture taken by GOJ throughout this unhappy episode.

GP-3

END

RICHARDSON

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 06017 23 988Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, ACDA 16, CCO 00, CIAE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSCE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, IO 13, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00,
SCI 05, RSR 01, /104 W 062182

O R 230805Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7529
INFO DOD
CINCPAC
HICOMRY
CINCUSARPAC
AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 6017

SUB: OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT

REF: STATE 120704

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH UPSET OVER LACK OF PRIOR INFORMATION ABOUT TIMING AND NEW INFORMATION CONTAINED IN SECDEF PRESS RELEASE, GOJ HAS PORTRAYED US ACTIONS IN FAVORABLE LIGHT TO PRESS AND DIET. NEWS THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM OKINAWA WILL REMOVE MUCH OF HEAT FROM PUBLIC CONCERNS OVER INCIDENT. END SUMMARY.

1. CHIBA (HEAD, FONOFF NORTH AMERICA DIVISION) CALLED POL COUNSELOR EARLY MORNING JULY 23 IN HIGHLY AGITATED MOOD TO SAY THAT FONMIN AICHI HAD BEEN GREATLY DISTURBED TO LEARN OF SECDEF PRESS RELEASE CONTAINED REFTEL FROM RADIO NEWS EARLY THIS MORNING. STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION WAS DELAYED TEMPORARILY PENDING NOTIFICATION TO THE GOJ WAS PARTICULARLY UPSETTING, SINCE AICHI DID NOT FEEL GOJ HAD BEEN NOTIFIED, AS WAS INFORMATION THAT GB WAS SUBSTANCE INVOLVED, OF WHICH JAPANESE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN INFORMED. CHIBA READ POL COUNSELOR LONG LECTURE ON SUBJECT OF HOW US HANDLING OF THIS INCIDENT,

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 06017 2309282

BEGINNING WITH ILL CONCEIVED ATTEMPTS TO CONCEAL MISHAP IN FIRST PLACE, REFLECTED BASIC LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND TRUST BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS ON SENSITIVE MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BOTH.

2. CHIBA OUTLINED FONOFF PLANS FOR DEALING WITH ANTICIPATED QUERIES FROM DIET AND PRESS AS FOLLOWS:

A) FONOFF PREPARING STATEMENT FOR RELEASE BY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT GOJ HAD BEEN ASKING USG TO WITHDRAW CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA AND GOJ IS HAPPY TO SEE THAT SUCH AN EARLY DECISION WAS MADE, THOUGH US HAD BEEN PLANNING IT FOR SOME TIME. STATEMENT WOULD ALSO REFLECT GOJ VIEW THAT US WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE EVERY CONSIDERATION TO SAFETY AND WELFARE OF OKINAWA INHABITANTS.

B) IN ANTICIPATION OF DIET QUESTIONING ABOUT SEQUENCE OF NOTIFICATION PROCESS, FONMIN AICHI WOULD STATE FOLLOWING: ON JULY 18 TOGO HAD ASKED OSBORN FOR RELIABLE OFFICIAL VERSION OF INCIDENT WHICH REPORTED BY WALL STREET JOURNAL THAT DAY; AT NOON JULY 20 OSBORN GAVE TOGO INTERIM REPORT, STRESSING THAT SUBSTANCE INVOLVED WAS NOT VX AND AT THAT POINT TOGO PRIVATELY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM OKINAWA; ON JULY 21, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM FONMIN, TOGO ASKED FOR REMOVAL OF WEAPONS AND OSBORN REPEATED AND ELABORATED ON INFO HE HAD PASSED ON JULY 20; ON JULY 22 AT 11:00 AM WASHINGTON TIME SECSTATE ROGERS TOLD AMBASSADOR SHIMODA, WHO HAD CALLED AT STATE DEPARTMENT ON OTHER BUSINESS, THAT US WOULD SHORTLY ANNOUNCE ITS DECISION TO REMOVE CERTAIN CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FROM OKINAWA. (AT THIS POINT CHIBA SAID THAT ONE REASON FOR AICHI'S REACTION TO SECDEF PRESS RELEASE WAS THAT SHIMODA'S CABLE, WHICH SIMPLY REPORTED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT TO WITHDRAW MUNITIONS WOULD BE MADE AT NOON JULY 22 AND DID NOT CONVEY TEXT, HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN FONOFF AT 0530 JULY 23 LOCAL BUT HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT TO AICHI'S ATTENTION BEFORE HE HEARD NEWS REPORTS OF PRESS RELEASE.)

C) IF ASKED WHETHER GOJ HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN INFORMED THAT GB WAS SUBSTANCE INVOLVED, AICHI WOULD STATE THAT OSBORN DID NOT SPECIFY, BUT THAT WAY IN WHICH HE DESRIBED

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PAGE 03 TOKYO 06017 230928Z

SITUATION HAD GIVEN GOJ CERTAIN INDICATIONS.

D) SINCE GOJ WILL INEVITABLY BE ASKED TO DESCRIBE NATURE OF GB, AICHI WILL STATE THAT EONOFF WILL SOON HAVE INFORMATION AVAILABLE (EONOFF IS WRITING BRIEF PAPER DESCRIBING GB BASED ON TEXT OF RECENT SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARINGS AND OTHER INFORMATION COMPILED FROM PUBLIC SOURCES).

3. SUBSEQUENT NEWS REPORTS INDICATE THAT CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY HORI HAD TOLD PRESS THAT THE US, BY RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST AND BY DECIDING TO WITHDRAW CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA AHEAD OF OTHER BASES, HAD TRULY DISPLAYED THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO JAPAN-AMERICA RELATIONS. HE REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION WHICH SHOWED TO THE WORLD AT LARGE AMERICA'S CONCERN FOR PEACE.

4. AICHI ALSO APPEARED BEFORE LOWER HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MORNING JULY 23. NEWS REPORTS INDICATE THAT HE WELCOMED THE AMERICAN DECISION TO REMOVE CBW AGENTS FROM OKINAWA, AND SAID THAT ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTRY'S INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM US, GAS WAS NOT, AS FIRST REPORTED, LETHAL VX GAS BUT WAS, IN FACT, GB GAS. HE ADDED THAT AMERICA WOULD RAPIDLY REMOVE THESE AGENTS FROM OKINAWA AND THAT GOJ WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO GET THESE AGENTS REMOVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. AICHI ALSO EXPLAINED THAT NIXON ADMINISTRATION, SINCE TAKING OFFICE, HAD BEEN RESTUDYING THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF CBWWEAPONS AND WAS THINKING OF REMOVING THEM FROM OKINAWA. AS A RESULT OF INCIDENT, IT WAS DECIDED TO SPEED UP THE WITHDRAWAL.

5. COMMENT: BELIEVE SECDEF'S ANNOUNCEMENT WILL TAKE MUCH OF HEAT OUT OF PUBLIC CONCERNS OVER CBW INCIDENT. WE WILL HAVE SOME REPAIR WORK TO DO, HOWEVER, ON LOSS OF CONFIDENCE FELT BY GOJ AND AICHI IN PARITCULAR. GP-3.

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Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
HICOMRY
CINCPAC

INFO : Amembassy BONN
CINCSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
COMMANDER 3rd AIR DIVISION, GUAM

121651

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions Incident

REF : State 121336

Reftel contains questions and answer portion of DOD news briefing of July 22, 1969. At that briefing Mr. Henkin took several questions to be answered later. Those questions and answers follow. BEGIN TEXT

Defense Questions and Answers:

Q. Was authority to deploy CB munitions overseas requested of Secretary Laird since he became Secretary of Defense and was it refused?

A. We are still seeking to determine whether Secretary of Defense Laird has been asked to approve overseas deployment of CB munitions.

(3)

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EA/P:RNKilpatrick:pap 7/23	5360	EA/P - H. Simpson

Clearances:

EA/J - Mr. Finn

DOD/PA - Mr. Willoughby

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ACTION:

Q. Was deployment of nerve agents to Okinawa approved by Mr. McNamara or President Kennedy?

A. The earlier deployment of such munitions was approved in October 1961 by a letter signed by the Hon. Roswell L. Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time. There is no indication as to what, if any, coordination or approval was sought outside the Department of Defense.

Q. When is the NSC study reviewing ~~reviews~~ U.S. CB policy due to be completed? And when will it be made public?

A. The Department of Defense cannot say when the current NSC study of CBW will be completed or what disposition will be made of the results.

Q. When did DOD notify State of the accident on Okinawa?

A. As to the question asking when the Department of Defense notified the State Department of the incident on Okinawa, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, notified DOD on the day of the incident and the message was routed to State shortly thereafter.

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Page 3

Army Questions and Answers:

Q. What is the medication for GB?

A. Atropine is administered as soon as any local or systemic symptoms due to a nerve agent are noted. As an adjunct to atropine, a therapeutic oxime, 2-PAM chloride (pyridine aldoxime methochloride) may be administered.

Q. Why was the paint being removed from the weapon? Was it to change the markings or what?

A. The paint was being removed in a normal, routine maintenance operation in which the paint is removed, then the munitions are repainted and repackaged. Repainting is normal maintenance procedure for all types of munitions to prevent corrosion. The paint was not being removed to change markings.

Q. What was the weapon? a A bomb?

A. We will not discuss the type of weapon.

Q. Was the leak in the weapon a structural defect? What caused the leak?

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Info:

ACTION:

A. The leak was not a structural defect in the weapon. During the paint removal procedure, a small leak x developed in the weapon adjacent to the fill plug.

Q. What are the names of the 24 individuals who were injured by the gas?

A. The names of individuals are not available here.

Q. What are the symptons of GB as an incapacitant?

A. The symptoms brought on by GB are:
(An unclassified military publication lists these symptons)

a. A feeling of tightnessiin the chest.

b. Unexplained running nose.

c. Difficulty in breathing either on inhaling or exhaling.

d. Small, pinpoint size pupils.

e. A drawing, slightly painful sensation in the eyes or unexplained dimnessof vision, occurring with pinpoint pupils. There may be twitching of the eyelids.

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Info:

ACTION:

Q. Is GB one of the early nerve agents? Was it developed by the Germans during World War II?

A. GB was one of the early nerve agents. It was developed by the Germans, who called it "Sarin."

Q. How ~~i~~ will the Army dispose of the defective weapon? How will the army dispose of the gas in the weapon?

A. First the weapon will be demilitarized and then the liquid GB contents detoxified.

Q. Are the 24 injured people completely recovered ? Will ~~they~~ they have any lasting physical problems from~~x~~ this exposure?

A. The 24 individuals that were effected by GB have fully recovered. They will not experience any further physical problems from this exposure.

Q. How long will the Edgewood Arsenal team be on Okinawa? When will their report be available to the press?

A. The Edgewood Arsenal team will remain as~~l~~long as is necessary ~~to~~ complete the mission of demilitarizing and detoxifying the weapon and its contents as well as checking thoroughly all other/ ~~items in storage.~~ items in storage.

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO
Naha
HICOMRY
CINCPAC

INFO: Amembassy BONN
CINCSAC
CINCUSARPAC
CINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
COMMANDER 3RD AIR DIVISION, GUAM

SUBJECT: Okinawa Munitions Incident

Following is the question and answer portion of the DOD news briefing by Mr. Henkin on July 22, 1969:

Q. You say just now that you have been able to notify the Japanese government, but I understood you knew about this on July 8th. What was involved--what took such a long time to notify the Japanese government promptly?

A. I can't respond to that directly, but I can say that we obviously are declassifying some information here, which heretofore has been classified. As you would understand, this has required some careful coordination.

Q. Is there anything being done to remove chemical agent stockpiles elsewhere overseas?

A. I have nothing to add on that.

Q. Does this mean that they are going to take all the toxic stuff off Okinawa?

(3)

Drafted by: EA/P:RNKilpatrick:pap | 7/22/69 | Tel. Ext. 5360 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/P - H. Simpson

Clearances:
DOD/PA - Mr. Freeman
EA/J - Mr. Finn

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Info:

ACTION:

A. It would be my understanding that all toxic agents would be moved.

Q. You said lethal at one place. There is a difference between lethal and incapacitating gases. Will other gases be retained? Other chemical agents?

A. I would not want to comment on that.

Q. What is the medication for GB?

A. That we'll take as a query, and we'll try to get the answer for you. I believe it is prescribed.

Q. Were you suggesting that had it not been for this incident plans are going forward and would have resulted in removal of such weapons in any case. This just accelerated it?

A. That is correct. For several years military officals, in this case it will be primarily the Army, have been studying plans, working on plans, for the removal of such agents from Okinawa.

Q. Why was the decision in '61 and '63 to stockpile this stuff?

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Info:

ACTION:

A. I have no knowledge of the reasons for that.

Q. X You say there was no plan for removal for several years?

A. Military officials have been working on plans for such removal from Okinawa for some time.

Q. Did you say several years?

A. I said several years.

Q. Is that what you meant?

A. They are both correct. For some time and for several years.

Q. What we're asking is was there a possibility of removing these being studied, or was there a plan in operation that would be slowly executed and has now been accelerated?

A. No, the plans in this matter have been worked on for some time, several years. This announcement here today of plans to accelerate their removal is related to the National Security Council study which is now underway and which is not yet completed and as I x say, in answer to your question, is partially a result of this incident.

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Info:

ACTION:

Q. What was the paint removal all about? That is unclear. Why are they removing paint?

A. I am, as you well know, not an expert on ordnance and munitions. I'm told that this is a procedure that is done to maintain the weapons. We will try to get you additional information on it.

Q. Were they changing the markings or removing the paint.

A. I don't know. We'll try to get.

Q. Were they bombs or canisters, or what?

A. I can only describe them as ordnance.

Q. Is that because you can't describe them, or we don't know at this point? Does the classification get in the way here?

A. That's correct.

Q. The other thing was, several years bothers me allittle bit. Was the plan to implement--in other words, was the implementation of the plans to remove these poison gases, was that started before this Administration came to office or was there a plan that was

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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Info:

ACTION:

in being before they came to office and then you started to implement it.

A. Studies into the removal of the ~~NEW~~ weapons date back prior to this Administration. The studies of the entire CBW problem, as reflected in the National Security Council study, have been I should say intensified.

Q. Anyone implement any plan before this Administration came along to remove this, or has it all just started.

A. Actual implementation?

Q. Yes.

A. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that is no, and if my knowledge is not correct we'll let you know, but to the best of my knowledge, it was not implemented.

Q. Your're making something of a point that no toxics have been sent anywhere since Laird took office, and my question is, is this because he ordered none to be or because none just happened to be. Did he have anything to do with the fact

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ACTION:

that none were deployed anywhere, or sent, or whatever that ~~xxxxxx~~ statement was?

A. This I don't know .

Q. Your're making so much of a point that nothing happened since he took office that perhaps it ought to be explained whether that's because of him or in spite of him.

A. I would presume that the deployment overseas of such agents would normally require Secretary of Defense approval.

Q. Is that a presumption you feel confortable with?

A. I feel comfortable enough with it to state it.

Q. Do you know whether he was asked for such approval and rejected it, or was not asked for such approval?

A. I don't know that answer. I'll check that. I hope someone is making notes here--one of my people--on information we'll try to get.

Q. Was this deployment approved by McNamara or John F. Kennedy?

~~A.~~ That I don't know.

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Q. Do I understand, on a background basis, presumably various people, the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary, have been discussing for some time whether it is wise to have the stuff overseas, whether it's useful militarily to have it at all, or whether it can be used tactically? Is this all involved in the study that you referred to?

A. Well, the NSC study, I would say, is all encompassing. I would describe it that way in terms of CBW. However, as to this particular matter, I am only addressing Okinawa.

Q. The import of what you say about Laird's--nothing has happened while Laird was Secretary--the implication there is he is opposed to this kind of shipment or deployment overseas, or even possibly to the actual use of such weapons at all. Now, if that is so, then he has to explain why he is permitting the start up of new facilities to produce this material.

A. What I am prepared to say and am saying, is that soon after he assumed office, Secretary Laird felt it essential to review

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the entire CBW/~~fixed~~ field area. He therefore in April requested that the National Security Council address this problem. The President ordered this study which is now underway.

Q. That does not constitute a decision one way or the other as to policy for future deployment. The next question is, if you remove from Okinawa, what is your policy as to stockpiles elsewhere?

A. I would have no comment on that.

Q. Thisiis a little ambiguous. Is this a leak that developed in the weapon as a result of structural defect, or ~~do~~ did someone kick a valve?

A. I don't know that precise detail. Perhaps we can get it more precisely. I know it occurred, to the best of my knowledge, during themaintenance operation.

Q. On~~e~~ one weapon and an adjacent weapon developed a leak?

A. No. If I said that in any way--it was adjacent to ~~the~~

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the plug of that weapon, so the accident occurred during the maintenance operation on the weapon .

Q. Were they using chemicals or what? If so, it's a damn thin container.

Q. We should get a little more detail on the accident because as this stuff is colorless and ordorless, how would these guys know a leak occurred unless they obviously were knocked out, so we have a scene here of several people working, quite a few people. How was this discovered? How long id it take for them to realize they were affected by the leak?

A. My information is that those people who were there knew immediately that they had been affected and prompt medical attention was given, and as I say, four military personnel were hospitalized briefly. I guess you might say, given dispensary treatment--I might say that--and were released--all released within six hours. Everybody was back on duty.

Q. Can you specify whether these were Army, Air Force, Marines?

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Origin
Info:

ACTION:

Page 10

A. Yes, they ~~x~~ were Army.

Q. Army?

A. Yes, we've identified the unit to which they belong. We were asked this the other day, and at that time.

Q. Are you ~~x~~ going to name these people at all?

A. Let's just put it--I'll accept the query that you would like their names.

Q. Could you spell out what you mean when you say low dosages and incapacitated. Does this mean they get diarrhea and vomiting? Were these the symptoms that showed up in this incident?

A. I don't know the answer to that. We'll try and get it for you.

Q. Isn't GB one of the pretty early nerve gases that was captured from the Germans?

A. That also I don't know. I'm trying to get as much unclassifed information as we can for you on this.

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ACTION:

Q. Without prompt and proper medical treatment, how rapidly can GB kill you?

A. I'd ~~x~~ prefer not to answer these technical questions here. We'll try to get the information, if we can, for you.

Q. It is lethal?

A. I ~~would~~ would say to you in answer to your question that without prompt and proper medication in high dosages, it could be lethal.

Q. Can you elaborate, or confirm, or deny, whatever the reports are about shipping nerve gas to Germany? How recent that was, and whether ~~it~~ it is still going on?

A. No, I can't.

Q. When is this NSC study due to be completed? Do ~~y~~ they have a date on that?

[redacted]

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Info:

ACTION:

A. I don't know. I just don't know.

Q/ Could we assume--let's put it this way the Secretary has ordered all the ~~xxxxx xxxx~~ toxic gases taken off Okinawa. The Secretary has ordered a study by the NSC.

A. No. Let me correct that. The President has ordered the NSC study, at the request of the Secretary.

Q. It seems to=me that the natural ~~x~~ thing is that we are formulating a new policy. Is that a fair assumption?

A. Well, it's certainly a correct and explicit assumption to say that the Government is taking a broad look, a deep look, into this problem. What the results of that will be I would not be able to say, but ~~x~~ it is a comprehensive study at the National Security Council level of this matter.

Q. Have you answered what the purpose was of having these lethal agents on Okinawa in the first place?

A. No. I was asked that, and I said I was unable to say why the decisions were made to transport this material there in 1961 and '63.

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Origin

ACTION:

Info:

Q. Q. Now we're back to the disposal problem. How is the Army going to get rid of this stuff if they do take it off Okinawa?

A. That's a good and fair question. I would assume--I know that this will require some study and ~~xp~~ probably some counsel from some civilian scientists.

Q. But that decision has not been made, I take it?

A. As to how. No.

Q. A ~~xxx~~ team went out from Edgewood and are detoxifying one weapon. Does this mean that we still have one weapon sitting out there leaking somewhere?

A. We have one weapon there that had caused some problem to those 24 people again, none of them injured--All returned to duty within 6 hours--which is now safe. There is no danger, I am told, of anyone being injured, but there is the problem of--the weapon is now safe.

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ACTION:

Q. Would you suggest that that one weapon had a structural problem?

A. I would not want to speculate on that.

Q. You said these people returned to duty within six hours. Are they still well or did they have--was there some further manifestation of--

A. The information that I have is they are well and going about their normal duties.

Q. Regarding the team on Okinawa, when are they coming back? When can we find out whatever they found out?

A. I don't have that information. We'll try and get it.

Q. What is the Defense Department's policy for the use and deployment of military tests of poison gas?

A. I think that answer--I could read it for you here--is stated in the answer to the first question in this letter that Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. signed.

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ACTION:

Q. Is that the one to the Congressman?

A. Right.

Q. Do we have chemical agents stored in--

Q. Can we have copies?

A. We will have it, and if we don't, we'll just Xerox this one. I am advised we have it, additional copies.

Q. Do we have chemical agents stored in Europe?

A. I have no comment beyond what I've said.

Q. Did we notify the Japanese right after the accident, or only after a story was published about it 10 days later?

A. I would think that that question would have to be addressed to the State Department.

Q. Don't you have to notify the State Department when something like this happens? How do they know?

A. The State Department and the Defense Department keep each other informed and State Department knows about it.

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Q. What does the Pentagon know about the State Department being informed in the case?

A. I'll have to check the exact time and get it for you.

Q. Wouldn't it be normal practice for someone from Chemical Warfare to bring ~~crew~~ crews into one of these storage areas to wear detection devices--you have safety devices around?

A. There were safety devices in the area ~~a~~ and that is the reason that the problem was detected immediately and the medical care was applied promptly and why it was possible to return everyone to duty within ~~six~~ six hours, some of them immediately.

Q. Was there any biological agent there? We're only talking about the "C" part.

A. I can state unequivocally that there are no--I would repeat--no U.S. ~~biological~~ biological weapons stored overseas.

Q. Any place?

A. Any place.

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Info:

ACTION:

Page 17

Q. You said U.S.--that leads to--that is, the U.S. has none. In other words you might be storing German-made biological weapons.

A. I can only speak for the United States Department of Defense. There ~~are~~ are many, many other countries in the world.

Q. Do you want to leave out the word "U.S."? The United States has no biological weapons, not just U.S. biological weapons.

A. Well, the way you put it, I certainly would accept that. "The United States has no biological weapons..." I didn't mean to be at all cute on this--on this serious sentence.

Q. Would you say that again?

A. I can state unequivocally that there are no U.S. biological weapons stored overseas.

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Q. Does that mean only in foreign countries, sovereign countries? How about Guam, etc?

A. It means overseas.

Q. That's on the record, I trust.

A. Everything I've said is on the record.

Q. You say unequivocally there are no U.S. biological weapons or that the United States has no biological weapons.

A. Either way.

Q. How about radiological? Would you add those?

A. I have no comment on that.

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE naha

HIMCOMRY Okinawa RYUKYUS IMMEDIATE

INFO: CINCPAC FOR POLAD Honolulu

SUBJECT: Okinawan Chemical Munitions Incident

Following is text of public statement being released by Department of Defense today reporting decision to remove chemical agents from Okinawa:

QUOTE The Department of Defense said today that preparations are being made to remove certain chemical agents, including some toxic agents, which were moved to Okinawa several years ago as a result of decisions made in 1961 and 1963.

It has been previously announced that at the request of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird the President ordered the National Security Council this spring to initiate a comprehensive study of chemical and biological warfare matters including overseas deployment.

No toxic chemical agents have been deployed overseas since Secretary Laird took office.

[redacted]

(3)

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AKXXXX
To Amembassy TOKYO, HIMCOMRY Ryukyus, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

The public release of certain information about a mishap on Okinawa was delayed temporarily pending notification to the Government of Japan. This notification has been accomplished, and it is now possible to report as follows:

On July 8, 23 U.S. Army soldiers and an American civilian employee of the U.S. Army were exposed briefly to the chemical agent, GB on Okinawa. No personnel were seriously affected. After precautionary medical observation, including brief hospitalization of four military personnel, all 24 persons were returned to full duty within six hours. There were no Ryukyuans or other non-U.S. nationals involved.

The accident occurred during routine maintenance operations conducted by members of the 267th Chemical Company.

During a [redacted] paint removal procedure a small leak [redacted] developed in one weapon adjacent to the fill plug. The 24 personnel experienced minor symptoms of toxic exposure and standard safety procedures, including the use ofprotective masks, were immediately instituted.

[redacted]

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~~ACTION~~
TO Amembassy TOKYO, HICOMRY ~~KW~~ RYUKYUS, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Ordnance teams entered the one building involved and rapidly eliminated the unsafe condition. The building was cleared and the decontamination process was completed without incident.

A team of experts from the Army's Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland has been sent to Okinawa to assist in detoxifying and disposing of the weapon.

As a result of this incident and in connection with the NSC study, a decision has been made to accelerate the previous planned removal of lethal chemical agents from Okinawa. Military officials have been working on plans for such removal from Okinawa for some time.

In all activities related to the disposition, storage, and maintenance of the agents on Okinawa, strict safety precautions have been employed at all times. As a result of these precautions, there have been no accidents which have caused any serious injury to a single individual on Okinawa.

Secretary of Defense Laird, commenting on the decision to remove these weapons, said today: 'When I became Secretary of

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~~ACTION~~:
TO: Amembassy~~XXXXX~~ TOKYO, HICOMRY ~~XX~~ RYUKYUS

Defense, I asked for immediate reports concerning CBW activities. I felt it essential to review the entire matter.

'For that reason, in April I also requested that the National Security Council review all CBW programs. This review of a complex matter involving national security is being expedited. As has been widely reported we have sought and will continue to seek the best advice we can obtain, particularly from civilian scientific authorities.

'It will continue to be my policy to provide the American public with the ~~x~~ maximum amount of information, consistent with national security requirements.' END QUOTE

End.

ROGERS

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CINCPAC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD Honolulu

121257

Excerpts from press briefing July 22, 1969 follow: BEGIN TEXT.

Q. Carl, I understand the United States is coming under increasing pressure from the Japanese to remove nerve gas from ~~the~~ Okinawa. Can you shed any light on this situation? Do we intend to do that?

A. I understand that the Department of Defense is making -- I think has made an announcement on this subject within the last few minutes. Now, I have not seen the full or final text of the announcement, so I am not in a position to describe it or comment on it. But I imagine that after the briefing, it will be running on the tickers.

I might add that our Minister Counselor in Tokyo, David Osborn, Deputy Chief of Mission, has had two meetings over the past weekend with Mr. Togo, who is the Director of North American Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. But I think we will have to wait and see what the Defense Department has

(3)

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to say about it.

Q. Well, can you say what the Minister Counselor told Mr. Togo?

A. Well, among other things, he informed Mr. Togo that the U.S. has no lethal chemical weapons stored in Japan, nor do we have any intention of proposing such storage in Japan.

And, with regard to Okinawa, he said that/~~xxxx~~ only trained U.S. personnel were permitted to handle this material.

Q. Well, is that an acknowledgment that nerve gas was stored in Okinawa?

A. I am not going to carry it any further than this, Nick, and I think you will have to --

Q. Only trained U.S. personnel are --

A. Are permitted to ~~x~~ handle this material or to enter into areas where it ~~xx~~ is stored.

Q. Well, it must be there, if that is the rule.

A. Well, I don't want to be mysterious about this, but I think the statement is pretty clear.

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Q. You haven't told us what it is that non-trained personnel are not allowed to handle.

A. This material.

Q. Well, would that material be nerve gas, Carl?

A. I am not going to draw any further conclusions on this for you, Nick.

Q. You are not going to draw any conclusions?

A. No.

Q. Well, if I say that you acknowledged that nerve gas is stored in Okinawa, are you then going to call a briefing and deny it?

A. You would be highly inaccurate if you did say that, but if you want to, I don't mind.

Q. I would be highly inaccurate if I said that?

A. If you said that I had said that, yes.

Q. But I must say that you leave me very confused and I am afraid I am going to commit a grievous error if you can't make ~~a~~ little more clear ~~x~~ what this material is.

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Page 4

A. I think this will be ~~ok~~ overtaken by the Defense Department announcement, in any case, Nick, so if you will exhibit the past patience that all of you have been noted for over the/few years, I think it will be helpful to me and I hope for you.

Q. One other question, Carl, in relation to this whole subject, you say that the Minister Counselor informed Mr. Togo that the United States does not store lethal chemical weapons in Japan. Now , I assume that, for the purposes of this whole situation, you don't consider Okinawa a part of Japan?

A. I had not anticipated getting into questions along those lines, Nick. I think our position on Okinawa is pretty clear. We have regarded Japan as having residual sovereignty over Okinawa, and there have been discussions on the future of Okinawa.

Q. What did Mr. Togo answer?

A. I am not going to speak for him, Andre, except to say the obvious, that he did express concern about this subject.

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continuation sheet

Q. Do you have his first name, by the way?

A. Yes, it's Fumihiko.

Q. Do you think this whole subject will be cleared up before Mr. Rogers arrives in Tokyo?

A. I think the Defense Department, John, will clear it up pretty much with its announcement today.

END

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INFO: HICOMRY Naha
CINCPAC

120542

SWATE

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions Incident

1. Ambassador Shimoda in call on Under Secretary Johnson July 18 stated that GOJ had in meeting between Togo and Osborn asked for full details on Okinawa chemical munitions incident reported in US press. He said GOJ wants in particular to prevent uneasiness from spreading among Okinawan people.

2. Johnson said there is no reason for uneasiness. Chemical munitions are not unusual and are stored in a number of places. There have been no accidents of consequence, although there was a little leakage in the present case. It was a simple mishap involving only ~~AMERICANS~~ Americans and those directly affected returned to normal activity after a few hours of observation.

(2)

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S/S - Mr. Brown RWB

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US takes maximum steps to assure that there will be no harm to local population.

END.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5951

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDITION PARA 1 LINE 8)

SUBJECT: OKINAWA CHEMICAL INCIDENT

REF: STATE 102400

1. FONOFF (TOGO, AMERICAN BUREAU) HAS INFORMED US FONMIN AICHI, WHO APPEARING BEFORE DIET AFTERNOON JULY 21, SEELS HE WILL BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO SAY:
"(A) US GOVT STATES THAT DISPOSITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAD ALREADY BEEN UNDER RESTUDY, AND GOJ HAS ASKED THAT, IF THERE ARE ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON OKINAWA, THEY BE WITHDRAWN.
"(B) SUBSTANCE INVOLVED IN RECENT INCIDENT WAS GAS USED AS CHEMICAL WEAPON, BUT WE ARE TOLD THAT IT WAS NOT, AS REPORTED IN WALL STREET JOURNAL, THE LETHAL VX."

2. WE TOLD TOGO WITH RESPECT TO (A) THAT EXPRESSION OF GOJ DESIRE IS OF COURSE MATTER OF FREE CHOICE. HOWEVER, WE CAUTIONED THAT FOR AICHI TO SAY HE HAD ASKED FOR "PROMPT" OR "IMMEDIATE" REMOVAL WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC OR HELPFUL FOR EITHER OF US.

3. WITH RESPECT TO (B), WE REMINDED TOGO THAT WE HAD PASSED THIS INFO IN CONFIDENCE, AND THAT WE HERE HAVE NO FURTHER INFO REGARDING NATURE OF SUBSTANCE, SO WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF VALIDITY OF ALL THE INFERENCES THAT MIGHT BE DRAWN FROM AICHI'S PROPOSED STATEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, AT TOGO'S REQUEST, AGREED TO ASK DEPARTMENT IF PROPOSED

(2)

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STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE.

4. REQUEST URGENT ADVICE.

GP-3. MAYER
BT

NNN

[redacted]

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S 4		AF	
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J 7		EA 13-16	
D		EUR	
C 10		NEA	
J/PM ~~20~~ Per Mr. Brown		OTHER AGENCIES	
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S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF		Defense 17	
		State Rep 18	
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E		ACDA ~~22~~ Per Mr. Brown	
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120492

46

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

60
B

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

[redacted] ONLY FOR

21 JUL 69 07 45Z

Origin

Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE

STATE

EXDIS

REF: Tokyo's 5951 - DEF 15 RYU IS-US
XR DEF 12 US

Concur in position Embassy took with Foreign Office on two points reftel.

End

120492

ROGERS

(1)

Drafted by: EA/J:RBFinn	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA/J-Mr. Finn

Clearances:
WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Holdridge
DoD - Dr. Doolin
~~DOD/ISA:COL Xxx~~
EA - Amb. Brown (substance)
S/S-O:Mr. Malone

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S ✓	4	AF	
U ✓ ✓	5, 6, 25	ARA	
J ✓	7	EA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	13 – 16
D		EUR	
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J/PM ✓	19 Per M. Brown	OTHER AGENCIES	
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XR DEF 12 US

SECRET 917

Tokyo 5947 1-20-69

PAGE 01 TOKYO 05947 200857Z

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12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W 046373 1/3

O 200830Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7482

S E C R E T TOKYO 5947

EXDIS

SUBJ: OKINAWA CHEMICAL INCIDENT

REF: (A) TOKYO 5941; (B) STATE 120400; (C) HICOM 200300Z JUL 69

1. GIST OF REFTEL (B) PASSED TOGO (FONOFF AMERICAN BUREAU) NOON JULY 20. HE EXPRESSED DEEP GRATITUDE FOR PROMPT INFORMATION, WHICH HE SAID WILL BE USEFUL BACKGROUND FOR FONMIN AICHI, WHO BEING GRILLED ON SUBJECT IN DIET JULY 21.

2. IN PASSING INFORMATION, DCM STRESSED THAT ONLY PARAS ONE AND SIX OF REFTEL (B) WERE BEING PASSED EXPLICITLY FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE OR USE IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS. AS INDICATED IN PARAS TWO, FOUR, AND FIVE OF REFTEL (B), DCM EMPHASIZED NEED TO HOLD REST OF INFO AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. TOGO ACCORDINGLY TOOK NOTES ONLY ON PARA SIX. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN INTENSE PUBLIC FOCUS ON INCIDENT AND RELENTLESS PROBING WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED BOTH FROM PRESS AND FROM OPPOSITION MEMBERS IN DIET, WE MAY EXPECT MUCH OR ALL OF INFORMATION TO END UP IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, AS PER PARA FIVE REFTEL (A).

3. LIKELIHOOD OF LEAKS, IN OUR VIEW, STRONGLY REINFORCES ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY HICOM IN REF (C) THAT HE BE AUTHORIZED TO PASS INFO REFTEL (B) TO YARA.

4. REQUEST DEPT PASS THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATE TO HICOM.

GP-1. MEYER

(2)

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S/S-O	11	Date 7/20/69	

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓	4	AF	
U ✓ ✓	5-6	ARA	
J ✓	7	EA	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 13-14-15-16
D		EUR	
C ✓	10	NEA	
J/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/P		White House	✓ ✓ 2-3
S/CPR		Vice President	
U/CF		Defense	✓ 17
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 200516Z

16
ACTION SS-10

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /011 W 045930

O 200300Z JUL 69
FM HICOM OKINAWA RYIS
TO SECDEF
CINCPAC
INFO DA
SECSTATE
CINCUSARPAC
AMEMB TOKYO

S E C R E T EXDIS
HCRI
DA FOR DUSA(IA). DEF FOR ASD(PA). STATE FOR FINN.
SUBJ: RED HAT INCIDENT(U)
REF: HCRI 190320Z JUL 69; OASD(PA)5017; STATE 120400(NOTAL)
1.(U) CE YARA HAS REQUESTED MEETINGS WITH CA ON 21 JULY AND WITH HICOM ON 22 JULY TO PROTEST INCIDENT AS REPORTED IN WALL STREET JOURNAL. CA-CE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1500 HRS, 21 JULY.
2.(S) INCIDENT RAPIDLY BUILDING UP STEAM HERE. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DESIRABLE THAT WE ASSURE YARA THAT ALL STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PRECLUDE ANY CHANCE OF HARM TO CIVILIAN POPULATION.

DEF 15 RYU JS-US

PAGE 2 RUAOADA1829 S E C R E T
3.(S) WE HAVE NOTED STATE INSTRUCTIONS TO EMBASSY IN STATE 120400. I RECOGNIZE THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN SAYING SOMETHING IN CONFIDENCE TO GOJ AND GIVING THE SAME THING IN CONFIDENCE TO GRI. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO MY POSITION HERE IF HELD O
N
MUCH TIGHTER LEASH THAN EMBASSY TOKYO. IF YARA DOES NOT RE-
CEIVE EVEN SMALL MEASURE OF SATISFACTION FROM US, IT WILL
FURTHER INFLAME LOCAL SITUATION. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT
POSSIBLE DOD PRESS RELEASE MENTIONED IN STATE 120400 MAY BE
TOO LATE TO ASSIST US IN MEETING WITH YARA.
4.(S) AS AN ESSENTIAL MINIMUM REQUEST I BE AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE YARA THAT AS IN THE PAST ONE OF MY PRIMARY CONCERNS IS WELFARE AND WELL BEING OF THE RYUKYUANS PEOPLE. IN KEEPING WITH THIS, ALL STEPS

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PAGE 02 200516Z

HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THIS INCIDENT TO PRECLUDE ANY DAMAGE TO RYUKYUAN PEOPLE. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT NO RPT NO RYUKYUANS WERE IN VOLVED IN THE INCIDENT.

5.(U) RESPONSE URGENTLY REQUESTED IN TIME FOR CA-CE MEETING 1500 HOURS, 21 JULY OKINAWA TIME SIGNED LAMPERT GP1

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O MR. MORTON.

[redacted]

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S/S-O	11	Date 7/20/69	Dpty

PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓	4	AF	
U ✓✓	5+6	ARA	
J ✓	7	EA	✓✓✓✓ 13-14-15-16
D		EUR	
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PAGE 01 TOKYO 05941 190518Z

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1 Tokyo 5941 7-19-69

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

041150

O 190420Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7477

S E C R E T TOKYO 5941

EXDIS

SUBJ: OKINAWA CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INCIDENT

REF: TOKYO 5933

SUMMARY: INCIDENT IS, AS EXPECTED, CAUSING MAJOR UPROAR IN JAPAN. EMBASSY SUGGESTS INFORMING GOJ, IF APPROPRIATE AND TRUE, THAT: (A) NO LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORED IN JAPAN; (B) CHEMICAL AGENT INVOLVED THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT "NERVE GAS"; (C) US WOULD NOT INTRODUCE HIGHLY LETHAL CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INTO ALLY'S TERRITORY WITHOUT TELLING ALLY; AND, (B) NO SUCH MUNITIONS WILL BE PRESENT AT TIME OF REVERSION. URGENTLY REQUEST AUTHORITY INFORM FONMIN OF (A), WHICH WE KNOW TO BE TRUE.

1. NEEDLESS TO SAY, SUBJECT INCIDENT BEING SENSATIONALIZED IN ALL JAPANESE MEDIA. THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE INOPPORTUNE. IT SETS BACK US-JAPAN RELATIONS JUST AT TIME WHEN CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CRITICAL OKINAWA ISSUE, WHEN WE HAD BEEN HOPEFUL THAT DEMONSTRATIONS AT TIME OF ECONCOM WOULD NOT BE TROUBLESOME, AND WHEN JAPAN'S SOCIALISTS NEED ANTI-AMERICAN FLAG TO WAVE TO RECOUP FROM LOW ESTATE TO WHICH THEY FALLEN IN WAKE OF TOKYO MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. EVEN LUSTRE OF APOLLO MISSION IS BEING TARNISHED.

2. CG MCGEHEE OF USFJ STATES THAT ONLY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS NOW STORED IN JAPAN ARE OF RIOT-CONTROL VARIETY. IMMEDIATE RELEASE TO FONOFF OF INFO TO EFFECT THERE ARE NO RPT NO LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORED IN JAPAN WOULD HAVE CALMING EFFECT, AND I REQUEST AUTHORITY TO PASS THIS INFORMATION AT ONCE.

(1)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TOKYO 05941 190518Z

3. IF IT COULD BE AUTHORITATVELY STATED THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT WERE NOT "NERVE GAS," PROMPT RELEASE OF SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL. IF WE COULD ALSO TELL GOJ THAT UNITED STATES DOES NOT, AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, STORE HIGHLY LETHAL CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN ALLY'S TERRITORY WITHOUT TELLING ALLY, THIS WOULD BE STILL MORE HELPFUL. OF COURSE, THIS LAST STATEMENT COULD NOT BE MADE UNLESS IT CONFORMS TO FACTS, NAMELY, UNLESS WE EITHER (A) HAVE NO SUCH MUNITIONS STORED IN ALLY'S TERRITORY, OR (B) IF SO, WE HAVE TOLD THEM. IN SAYING THIS, WE WOULD WANT TO AVOID APPEARING TO ACCEPT THIS AS TREATY OBLIGATION VIS-A-VIS JAPAN, JUST AS WE HAVE ALWAYS TOLD GOJ ABOUT SSN VISITS IN ADVANCE, THOUGH NOT REQUIRED BY TREATY TO DO SO.

4. IF RPT IF SUCH MUNITIONS ARE IN FACT STORED IN OKINAWA, THEN SOONER OR LATER, IN OUR OPINION, THEY WILL HAVE TO BE REMOVED. CONTINUED PRESENCE THIS TYPE MATERIEL NOT COMPATIBLE WITH HEALTHY US-GOJ RELATIONSHIP EVEN BEFORE REVERSION, AND AFTER REVERSION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO JAPAN. IF, AS WE BELIEVE, REMOVAL IS INEVITABLE, OUR SUGGESTION WOULD BE THAT WE BE GIVEN PROMPT AUTHORIZATION TO TELL GOJ IN CONFIDENCE THAT, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH TYPE WEAPONRY EXISTS NOW IN OKINAWA, GOJ CAN HAVE OUR ASSURANCE IT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE THERE AFTER DATE OF REVERSION.

5. ANY ASSURANCES WE GIVE GOJ EVEN IN CONFIDENCE WILL OF COURSE BECOME PUBLIC, AND THIS SHOULD BE OUR PURPOSE, IF WE WANT TO DAMP DOWN PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS RE THIS ISSUE IN TIMELY FASHION. CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT ABOVE PROPOSALS WILL AVERT ALL FURTHER TROUBLE, BUT IF WE PROVIDE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES PROMPTLY ON AS MANY OF ABOVE POINTS AS POSSIBLE, WE WILL BE IN BETTER POSITION TO RIDE OUT STORM.

GP-1 MEYER
BT

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Classification

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FOR ONLY

19 JUL 69 22 19Z

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE

HICOM, Okinawa, Ryis IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD Naha Honolulu

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Incident

REF: Tokyo's 5941

1. You may inform GOJ that no lethal chemical weapons are stored in Japan nor do we have any intention of proposing such storage in Japan. We would not object if GOJ wishes to make this public.

2. You may inform GOJ in confidence that (a) some chemical munitions were located on Okinawa in 1963 and/1965 ~~1964~~ as a result of decisions taken by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; (b) this Administration initiated a review of the whole question of deployment of chemical munitions as part of NSC directive in May of this year; and (c) in accordance with this review the Administration has ordered the removal/~~and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of lethal stocks on Okinawa.

3. No decision has been reached here with regard to an announcement, but it is possible that essential facts of the

---

(3)

Drafted by: EA: Winthrop Brown WB(mg) | Tel. Ext. 6684 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA: Marshall Green mg

Clearances:
White House - Mr. Kissinger
S/S - Mr. Hawley MH HK (mg)
DOD - Mr. Nutter for mh

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Classification

2

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Origin

ACTION:

Info:

given to press by DOD early next week if inquiries persist here. foregoing will be/~~contained in an announcement by DOD~~

4. If Japanese authorities inquire as to how long it is likely to take to relocate these munitions from Okinawa, you may respond in strict confidence that/~~process~~ schedule for removal of material will be based on advice of the Science Adviser to the President. FYI: Our tentative ~~thought is that~~ judgment is that process may take about a year, but you should not be pinned down to any time frame. END FYI.

5. You may tell FO for its confidential repeat confidential information on a close-hold basis that chemical involved was not repeat not VX as reported in Wall Street Journal. Chemical involved is not fatal, even in large amounts, if proper medication administered. We have not been able to establish any connection between material involved in 8 July accident and earlier swimming incident referred to in Journal article.

6. You may assure GOJ that pending actual removal every possible precaution will be taken to guard against accidents and to prevent uneasiness among Okinawan people. a. Material involved will continue to be kept under tight security and protective control. b. Only trained US personnel are permitted to handle material or enter areas where it is stored. c. There is no

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Origin

ACTION: 3

Info:

repeat no possibility of widespread damage resulting from any leakage of material over wide area or from other type of accident. d. Maximum efforts will be made to prevent any recurrence of similar incidents. e. US authorities will continue at all times to ensure welfare of inhabitants of Ryukyus. No repeat no Ryukyuans were involved in incident.

7. Embassy and Japanese authorities may use information in immediately preceding paragraph in answering questions.

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U	5, 6	ARA	
J		EA	13, 14, 15, 16
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119082

DEF 15 RYUIS-US

YR DEF 12 US

INDICATE:
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☐ CHARGE TO

18 JUL 69 02 17Z

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY

INFO: HICOMRY PRIORITY

STATE 119082

~~NODIS~~

REF: State 115271

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions Incident

1. Wall Street Journal has got at least part of story regarding incident and may publish it Friday, although high-level efforts being made to dissuade Journal from publishing.

2. Japanese Embassy (Kiuchi) told Dept July 17 that Journal had called Embassy to ask if Embassy or GOJ advised of this incident. Kiuchi had impression Journal did not have many details but did know that gas was involved. Dept Officer (Finn) told Kiuchi he not in position confirm or deny story. Kiuchi intends to report these points to Foreign Office.

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
EA/J:RBFinn:esr	7-17-69	6051	EA-Ambassador Brown

CLEARANCES:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Doolin

EA - Mr. Green

S/S-O: GMalone

White House: Mr. Kissinger

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Classification

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TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: TOKYO (PRIORITY)

3. Since Foreign Office will be getting some details on incident and since press story may break, Embassy should inform Foreign Office soonest along lines paragraph two reftel as modified per following paragraph Since FO will know from Kiuchi report that chemical munitions are involved, it may raise this point. Embassy should suggest we both stick to line in following paragraph.

4. Modified contingency response follows: BEGIN QUOTE As a result of a mishap which occurred on July 8 on maintenance operation Okinawa while they were working on a ~~classified project~~ maintenance operation twenty-three United States military personnel and one United States civilian employee were placed under medical observation. All were released and returned to full duty within about six hours. No other personnel were involved.

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ACTION: TOKYO (PRIORITY)

~~HEXE~~

In response to a query regarding the presence of certain types of material, we would propose to say: 'I am not going to discuss that.' END QUOTE.

5. Embassy should state that US officials will stick to above line in public answers to press inquiries, and we hope FO can do same in any public statements. Embassy should also tell FO that if GOJ desires more information, Embassy will make appropriate inquiry of Department. FYI We think FO may not want fuller information on this incident so as to be able to state publicly that GOJ was informed by US about incident ~~hxxxyhxx~~ but that GOJ lacks detailed information. If however GOJ believes it needs fuller background we will consider whether we should supply it and also try to work out with GOJ common policy on public statements. END FYI

END

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Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy TOKYO PRIORITY

Info:

PAGE FOUR

6. Embassy and HICOMRY should not rpt not comment on this subject and should refer all questions to Washington. FO should be asked to do same and not rpt not comment until advised contigency response released in Washington.

GP-1

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Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO - IMMEDIATE
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HICOMRY

Subject: Text of Article on Okinawa Munitions Incident

There follows verbatim text of article on Okinawa chemical weapons incident which appeared on front page of Wall Street Journal on July 18, 1969:

(TEXT ATTACHED)

ROGERS

119195

(2)

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/P:RNKilpatrick:eb	5360	EA/P - Howard R. Simpson

Clearances:
EA/J - Mr. Finn

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Nerve Gas Accident

Okinawa Mishap Bares Overseas Deployment Of Chemical Weapons

Leak at U.S. Base Fells 25; Angry Reaction Expected At Home, From Japanese

Coup for Red Propaganda?

By ROBERT KEATLEY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The United States has apparently deployed operational weapons armed with lethal chemical agents as part of its deterrent force overseas.

That conclusion is indicated by an accidental release of deadly VX nerve gas at the U.S. base on Okinawa last week. A container of the gas or a weapon carrying it broke open there, and some 25 persons were hospitalized after exposure to it. Word of the incident has just gotten back to Washington. At a late hour last night, high Defense and other Administration officials were debating what to say about the matter or whether to say anything at all.

Their sensitivity springs from awareness that disclosure of the unsuspected deployment could have broad and adverse repercussions for the U.S. overseas and for the Administration at home. It could create a wave of anti-American feeling abroad just as President Nixon sets forth next week on a planned triumphal tour following the U.S. moon voyagers' Pacific splashdown. More important, it could touch off violent leftist demonstrations in Japan on the eve of Secretary of State William Rogers' visit there to discuss continued U.S. use of Okinawa as the main American strategic base in Asia. The news will almost certainly prompt propagandists in all Communist countries to attack Washington's political and military objectives.

Capitol Hill Controversy

The information seems certain, in addition, to arouse new Congressional opposition to the development of toxic weapons in particular and to the military in general. Word of the Okinawan accident may come at a particularly bad time for advocates of deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile, since that project is now being debated by the Senate.

Chemical and bacteriological warfare (CBW) has become highly controversial on Capitol Hill recently. An accident at the Utah testing range killed some 6,400 sheep last year. This spring Americans learned that the Army planned to dispose of some 27,000 tons of "surplus" CBW agents and equipment by transporting them across country by train and dumping them into the Atlantic Ocean off the New Jersey coast; this plan was widely condemned as dangerous and has since been dropped.

On top of such controversy comes the surprise and troublesome disclosure that such deadly gases are on Okinawa. The island is officially Japanese property; Tokyo retains "residual sovereignty" over the big U.S. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps complex, though the U.S. has nearly complete freedom in managing it. The base also hosts giant B52 bombers and some medium-range missiles deployed as a deterrent against Communist China. Nuclear explosives are kept on the base for possible use by these planes and missiles, and that's a main reason for Japanese opposition to continued American use of the island.

The news reaching Washington about the Okinawa accident is little more than that it happened. There is no detail on how it took place. But it is believed that all the victims were American soldiers and none were Okinawan employes of the U.S. Apparently no deaths occurred, though Pentagon officials will not discuss the matter in detail.

The VX nerve gas that escaped at Okinawa is a mainstay of the U.S. CBW arsenal. It is this agent that drifted outside the Utah testing range last year and killed the sheep in nearby Skull Valley.

A Deadly Gas

VX is one of the deadliest nerve gases in existence, since it persists longer than others when released into the atmosphere. A few milligrams, if inhaled, cause death within seconds; a slightly larger dose on the skin can kill in minutes if certain countermeasures, such as artificial respiration and special drugs, are not taken immediately. In the Okinawan accident, it is believed that countermeasures were quickly taken and that no large area was contaminated.

It is possible that a previous instance of CBW contamination on Okinawa occurred last summer. About 100 Okinawan children became mysteriously ill after swimming near a U.S. base; several were hospitalized with such symptoms as high fevers. American military authorities investigated allegations that chemical agents might have leaked into the sea but told worried Okinawan officials they couldn't find evidence of any such mishap.

An Army technical manual describes the symptoms of nerve gas poisoning as "running nose, tightness of chest, dimness of vision, pinpointing of eye pupils, difficulty in breathing, drooling, excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, twitching, jerking, staggering, headache, confusion, drowsiness, coma, convulsion, cessation of breathing, death."

Thus far, it has never been disclosed that the U.S. has deployed any lethal chemical agents outside this country. And apparently the Japanese government has never been notified, officially or otherwise, of the presence of nerve gases on Okinawa. The disclosure seems certain to prompt an angry storm of reaction in Japan. Leftists there have demonstrated frequently against the U.S. use of nonlethal tear and nausea gases in South Vietnam, and the use of napalm against North Vietnam. And now experts on Japan are expressing concern about new outbursts in Tokyo against the storage on Okinawa of CBW agents, which are more feared and closer to home than any weapons deployed in Vietnam.

The Army recently told Congress that it spends about $350 million annually on various phases of CBW research and development. The chemical agents include nerve and [illegible] gases.

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that produce various physical effects ranging from temporary incapacitation to death. Biological agents, including germs and viruses, cause diseases, some fatal; current Army research involves studies, for example, of ways to spread plague and other disabling illnesses. But the Okinawa accident did not involve such biological weapons, and there is no reason to believe that any such agents are located there.

Recent protests over the existence of chemical and biological weapons—certain to mount now—have already caused the Senate Armed Services Committee to cut from this fiscal year's budget $16 million planned for research and development on lethal offensive CBW weapons. Democratic Sen. Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire explained: "Measured against this nation's traditional opposition to the offensive use of such agents, we could not justify research and development expenditures for that purpose."

Though it isn't known just what weapons or gas containers were involved in the Okinawa incident, several ways of delivering CBW agents have been developed by military researchers. These include grenades, shells and small ground-to-ground rockets that would explode on impact, releasing the agents. There are also bombs and airplane-launched rockets; such bombs would probably be triggered just above ground rather than on impact so the CBW agents would cover a large area.

The CBW material the Army recently proposed to sink off the New Jersey coast included 2,660 tons of rockets and 12,322 tons of Air Force bomb clusters, both filled with nerve gas.

Another system involves the use of generators. A CBW generator includes a tank filled with an agent, a source of pressure and a nozzle through which the agent is pumped into the atmosphere—upwind of the target area.

One report says the Army missiles called Corporal and Sergeant were designed at least partly for delivery of CBW agents. Sergeant, it has been claimed, can fire a 1,600-pound payload about 85 miles; according to one estimate, if this missile's warhead were filled with nerve gas and the gas were dispensed by an aerosol spray process, it could kill about one-third of the people in an area one mile in diameter. These missiles are deployed in Western Europe, but it's not known if they are armed with CBW warheads.

Years ago President Franklin Roosevelt vowed the U.S. would never be the first to use chemical or biological weapons in warfare, and this presumably remains official policy. But the Pentagon has consistently opposed efforts to restrict sharply U.S. development of such hardware; military men contend this country must know about ways of devising CBW weapons, if only for deterrent reasons.

The Soviet Union, it is reported, has a large CBW research and development program of its own. Back in 1960, Lt. Gen. A. G. Trudeau, then the U.S. Army's research chief, told Congress that "we know that the Soviets are putting a high priority on development of lethal and nonlethal weapons, and that their weapons stockpile consists of about one-sixth chemical munitions. Russian leaders have boasted that they are fully prepared to use new chemical weapons of great significance, and we know Soviet forces are trained in their use."

A 1960 Army study claims each Soviet division has a "specific unit devoted to the field of chemical warfare." A Russian general was quoted as stating: "Many of our scientists . . . regard research on the actions of poisons and on the development of antidotes to be their patriotic duty."

To justify its CBW activities, the U.S. Army emphasizes the idea of "retaliatory capability as a deterrent." The generals also stress they must know what the offensive capabilities of such weapons are before they can devise defenses. In addition, many military men justify such weapons as being more efficient and much less destructive than nuclear weapons; they emphasize that many CBW agents are only temporarily disabling but not lethal.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SCI 05, ACDA 16, OST 01, AEC 11,
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SUBJ: FONMIN ADDRESS TO UN ASSOCIATION OSAKA

1. FONMIN KIICHI AICHI GAVE ONE AND HALF HOUR TALK TO OSAKA UN ASSOCIATION JULY 16. ANNOUNCED TOPIC WAS OKINAWA AND FONMIN BROUGHT ALONG PREPARED TEXT WHICH COVERED THAT SUBJECT, BUT LATTER HALF OF HIS PERFORMANCE WAS EXTEMPORANEOUS AND COVERED THE WATERFRONT OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, DISARMAMENT, EXPO, ETC.

2. IN WELL-MODULATED PRESENTATION ON OKINAWA, FONMIN (WITH AMPLE EXPLANATION OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND) TOLD AUDIENCE THAT HE HAD PUT GOJ REQUEST FOR "SPEEDY" "HOMELAND LEVEL REVERSION" TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID "SPEEDY" MUST BE DEFINED AS "SOMETIME DURING THE COURSE OF 1972" IN VIEW OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR REVISION WHICH MUST BE MADE IN JAPAN, OKINAWA AND THE U.S. AICHI GAVE LENGTHY AND SYMPATHETIC DESCRIPTION OF PAST U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT DETERIORATION OF OKINAWA SECURITY ROLE WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM REVERSION, AND DETAILED PICTURE OF JAPAN'S INTEREST IN PRESERVING DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF OKINAWA BASES. HE SAID THAT, WHILE "HOMELAND LEVEL REVERSION" WAS THE NATURAL AND APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION FROM JAPAN'S POINT OF VIEW, THERE MUHT BE REVEALED UPON FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH U.S. FACTORS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(12)

(11) Approved by: Amb. Johnson
7/14/69

16663

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 7, 1969

SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion

PARTICIPANTS: U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary of State
Howard M. McElroy, EA/J

Nobumoto Ohama, Chairman, Prime Ministers Special Advisory Committee on Okinawa and Other Problems

~~COPIES TO:~~ Ichiro Suetsugu, Member, above committee
Yoshiyasu Sato, Embassy of Japan, interpreter

COPIES TO:

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1. Dr. Ohama said that he planned to meet a number of Congressional leaders during his visit, including the Speaker and Congressmen Matsunaga, Inoue, Zablocki and Morgan. Noting that these men were on the whole sympathetic with Japan's position concerning Okinawa and did not necessarily represent a majority viewpoint, the Undersecretary expressed the hope that Ohama would see some of those very influential leaders who are skeptical about the Okinawa situation. We will face very serious political problems concerning Okinawa, although these feelings have not yet emerged publicly. Leaders of the Armed Services Committees such as Senators Symington, Jackson and Russell and Congressmen Adair and Rivers will be very influential and are now in general hostile toward reversion. Congressional attitudes are especially important since the President may feel that he should seek formal Congressional action on Okinawan reversion unlike the earlier cases of Amami Oshima and Ogasawara. Even if such formal action is not needed, the President will not move ahead without the informal understanding of the Congressional leadership. The Undersecretary said he had expressed similar views in Tokyo, but since his return private talks had impressed him even more with the serious problems that we will face in the Congress.

2. Mr. Suetsugu asked whether reversion itself or the status of the bases caused greater problems with the Congress. Although both

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

EA/J

38

DATE: July 2nd 1969
1500

SUBJECT: Okinawa Reversion

PARTICIPANTS: Richard L. Sneider, NSC
Howard M. McElroy, State (EA/J)
Nobumoto Ohama, Chairman, Prime Minister's Special Advisory Committee on Okinawa and other Problems
Ichiro Suetsugu, member, same committee
Yoshiyasu Sato, Embassy of Japan, Interpreter

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Army - Mr.
DOD/ISA - 1

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1. Dr. Ohama said that there had been a drastic change in public opinion since he had met Mr. Sneider two years ago. At that time, most Japanese would have been satisfied with a reversion agreement with no changes in the status of US bases. Public opinion is rather different now and the position advanced by Foreign Minister Aichi represents the "last line" from which the GOJ can not recede.

2. Mr. Sneider said that it would not be appropriate for him to discuss the reversion problem in detail since Ambassador Meyer will be leading US negotiations and will be discussing these matters with Foreign Minister Aichi. The US did look forward to serious discussions which we enter in the hope of working out arrangements satisfactory to both governments. Very complex and difficult issues are involved and these are best handled by "quiet diplomacy."

3. Mr. Sneider said that the US side appreciated the depth of Japanese feeling about Okinawa, but he was not so sure that the Japanese understood US feelings on this subject which run equally deep if not always on the surface; he cited Senator Byrd's recent speech as an example of one line of Congressional opinion. The Okinawa solution must be found in terms which meet our

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security requirements and each side must recognize the other's public opinion.

4. Mr. Suetsugu said that he had just spent a week in Okinawa where Aichi's "proposal" had been very well received even among reformists. Ryukyuans now feel reversion is approaching and are beginning to think beyond reversion. Reversion slogans are now considered obsolete and the leftists are trying to develop new slogans calling for complete withdrawal of US bases but with little success. The general reversion mood has in fact "outpaced" the actual reversion negotiations.

5. Mr. Sneider commented that the Ryukyuan sentiment seemed premature since we have not reached agreement. Reversion negotiations can not be based on a mood since reversion would involve very basic national decisions with broad implications for both governments. He said he looked forward to going to Tokyo where he would assist the Ambassador who would be responsibile for these very difficult negotiations.

6. Mr. Sneider said that the discussion was off the record and that he would prefer that Dr. Ohama not mention to the press its contents or even the fact that they had met. Dr. Ohama agreed adding that he had no wish to insert himself into Okinawa negotiations.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION EA 15

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P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,IO 13,AID 28,UPW 01,RSR 01,164
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5371

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

HICOMRY ALSO PASS ADCOM AND AMCONUNIT

SUBJ: DEFENSE FACILITIES AGENCY VISIT TO OKINAWA

1. FONOFF INFORMED THE EMBASSY TODAY THAT PLANS FIRMING UP FOR VISIT TO OKINAWA JULY 10-20 BY TEAM COMPOSED OF FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF DFA, ONE FROM PMO AND ONE FROM FONOFF. PURPOSE OF TEAM VISIT IS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE TO GRI IN HELPING RELIEVE CERTAIN PROBLEMS ARISING FROM OPERATION OF BASES. THIS ASSISTANCE BEING OFFERED PURSUANT TO TOKONAMI-HICOM JOINT STATEMENT IN APRIL (REFTEL). GROUP HAS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN JET NOISE AND FUEL LEAKAGE ISSUES AT KADENA AND WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE TOUR OF KADENA AIR BASE AND ALSO OF FIRING RANGE IN KIN AREA. WHILE IN OKINAWA GROUP ALSO HOPES TO HAVE BASE TOUR, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A BRIEF LOOK AT LICENSED FARMLAND AND BASE ROADS AND HOPES TO VISIT RDWC AND REPCO FACILITIES.

2. EMBASSY ECOMMENDS THAT THESE WISHES BE MET. FONOFF ADVISES THAT GROUP WILL ALSO MEET WITH GRI QUIETLY WITH PURPOSE OF URGING THEM TO ATTEMPT TO SET UP MORE RATIONAL SYSTEMATIC METHOD OF SUBMITTING CLAIMS TO US MILITARY. FURTHERMORE SUBJECT OF US FACILITIES IN OKINAWA HAS BEEN

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Info:

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ACTION: Amembassy TOKYO

STATE 115271

SUBJECT: Okinawa Chemical Munitions Leak Incident

1. We have received no inquiries on this subject here.

2. Proposed contingency response follows:

As a result of a mishap which occurred while they were working on a classified project, several soldiers were placed under medical observation. All were released and returned to full duty within about six hours.

In response to a query regarding the presence of certain types of material, we would propose to say: "I am not going to discuss that."

3. Above response will be used only if incident becomes known publicly.

ROGERS

END

WBD

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/P:RALewis:eb 7/11/69	5378	EA - Ambassador Brown EA/P ~~Robert A. Lewis~~

Clearances:
EA/J - Mr. Straus
S/S - Mr. Brown (RWB)
P - Mr. Sheehan

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~~Ex.~~ Secy.

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POST Tokyo

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 15, 1970

SECRET/~~NODIS~~

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EA - Mr. Green

SUBJECT: Supplemental material for your meeting with Foreign Minister Aichi, September 16
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

The President has directed Secretary Laird to delay removal of chemical munitions from Okinawa until adequate storage facilities can be constructed on Johnston Island in accordance with recommendations in the environmental study conducted by HEW. We understand that DOD expects to remove the munitions from Okinawa late this year or early next. In view of the extreme sensitivity on this subject in Japan and Okinawa, I think you should outline the present situation in confidence to Aichi stressing our intention to remove the munitions as soon as possible consistent with safety requirements.

We understand that earlier this week Secretary Laird outlined DOD plans to Minister Nakasone (without reference to the President's interest) and that Nakasone subsequently revealed the plans (slightly garbled) to the press.

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NODIS REVIEW
Cat A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by:
Date: 7/27 1978

Attachment:

Memo from the President

Clearance:

EA/J - Mr. Erickson

cc: J, C, U

EA/J:HMcElroy:bd ext.,23152 9/15/70

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11:00 am

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 14, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EA - Marshall Green MG

SUBJECT: Visit with Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi, 11:00 a.m., Wednesday, September 16 - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

You have agreed as an exception to meet with Foreign Minister Aichi who will be in the U.S. for the opening of the 25th UNGA. Aichi specifically requested the meeting following your conversation last week with Ambassador Ushiba when you informed the latter that you would not be able to go to New York as planned. You last saw Foreign Minister Aichi during your visit to Tokyo in July.

We are not at this time aware of any specific matter which the Foreign Minister may particularly wish to discuss. From our standpoint, however, we have a number of pending issues and the visit will be an excellent opportunity to accomplish three goals:

--Provide a focal point for further Japanese consideration of augmented aid to Cambodia in the wake of the President's letter to Prime Minister Sato which was delivered on September 11.

--Imply that the U.S. is prepared to consider seriously the personal proposal of GATT Director-General Long to resolve the textile dispute.

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DEF 15 JAPAN U.S. - US

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--Emphasize the importance of both countries seeking to calm the charged atmosphere in our bilateral economic relations.

Talking points on these topics as well as other subjects which may arise (Okinawa matters, security relationships, and Indo-China developments) are attached.

The Foreign Minister will probably be accompanied by Ambassador-designate Ushiba, North American Affairs Director-General Togo, Counselor (Translator) Akatani, and an additional Embassy Officer. Unless otherwise informed, the American side would include Under Secretary Johnson (if possible), Assistant Secretaries Green and Trezise, and Country Director Richard A. Ericson.

Attachments:

Tab A - Talking Points
Tab B - Issues Paper
Tab C - Position on UN Issues
Tab D - Biographic Sketch

Clearances: EA - Ambassador Brown
E - Mr. Trezise (subs)
EA/J - Mr. Ericson

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JAPAN

Talking Points

Issues We Should Raise:

1. Courtesy Points

--Refer to your trip to Tokyo last July and note your pleasure in seeing Foreign Minister Aichi again.

--Comment that you appreciated the opportunity of meeting recently with Japanese Self-Defense Agency Director-General Nakasone. His trip was useful from the American viewpoint; you hope it was also considered successful from the Japanese side.

2. Okinawa Reversion - Reversion negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily in general. We expect their completion by next summer followed by Congressional consultations and reversion sometime in 1972. We are, however, not satisfied with the initial Japanese attitude on two important problems which have emerged in the negotiations: (a) The future of American business interests on Okinawa, and (b) Continuation of Voice of America broadcasting from Okinawa. You should:

--Express general satisfaction in the negotiations and confidence that reversion can be accomplised in 1972.

--Ask Aichi's personal attention to two matters which are essential to reversion.

A. State that an early GOJ public gesture reassuring American businessmen on Okinawa of their position after reversion would be

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very helpful to the businessmen and important to us in defending reversion arrangements.

B. Request Aichi's assistance in getting GOJ agreement in principle to continued VOA operations from Okinawa so that negotiators can work out specific arrangements.

3. Textiles (SECRET) - The textile problem has been essentially frozen since the break-down of U.S.-Japan negotiations last June. Current indications are that the Japanese industry remains adamantly opposed to restraints until the outcome of the Mills Bill is more clear. At the multilateral meeting held in Geneva last July, GATT Director-General Long suggested a personal compromise proposal involving a phased approach to the problem. The Japanese officials attending the meeting did not comment on its prospects.

--State that you hope the GOJ is fully aware that the textile problem remains an important issue in U.S.-Japan relations and it must be resolved. As previously indicated, the President and key elements of Congress are committed to a limitation on the inflow of synthetic and woolen fiber, fabrics and apparel into the United States.

--State that the suggestion offered by GATT Director-General Long at the multilateral meeting in Geneva last July might offer some possibilities for resolving the problem. Imply that the U.S. is willing to explore the matter. (We are not in a position at this time to make any comments on specific aspects of the Long proposal.)

4. U.S.-Japan Economic Tensions (CONFIDENTIAL) - The break-down of the textile negotiations, the Mills Bill and its associated debates, recent USG anti-dumping actions (TV tubes) and GATT Article XXVIII discussions (stainless steel flatware) concerning Japanese products

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have created strong tensions in U.S.-Japan economic relations. Nevertheless, as forecast to you in Tokyo in July, the Japanese Government on August 25 announced the Third Stage of its Four Stage program of capital liberalization and also completely liberalized some trade items and eased procedures on others.

--Recall your conversation in Tokyo with Sato, Finance Minister Fukuda and Foreign Minister Aichi and their expressions of intent to make liberalization more "meaningful and significant".

--Note with qualified approval the recent GOJ actions concerning capital and trade liberalization. Express appreciation that the capital liberalization decision substantially broadened the possibilities for foreign investment and that the timetable is being accelerated. Note, however, that continuing qualifications such as a 50% limitation on most liberalized industries dilute the attractiveness of the Japanese actions.

--Express the hope that Japan's programs of trade and capital liberalization will continue to be rapidly accelerated. This is essential on its own merits and it also helps the Administration to withstand protectionist pressures. Note that a dramatic Japanese move in this area would have a significant impact.

--Add that almost $10 billion in U.S.-Japan trade proceeds smoothly and that it is essential that both Governments work to contain the emotional pressures which result from our bilateral problems.

5. Indo-China - (A general background paper on Indo-China will be forthcoming)

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A. Aid to Cambodia

--Refer to the recent Letter from the President to the Prime Minister which noted the initial $2 million of aid extended by the GOJ to Cambodia through the International Committee of the Red Cross and expressed the President's hope that the Prime Minister would give his continuing attention to the subject.

--Ask Aichi for the GOJ's assessment of the Cambodia Government. (The Foreign Office has recently taken a more optimistic view of the prospects for Lon Nol but Aichi is reportedly somewhat dubious.)

--Stress your conviction that prospects in Cambodia are positive. State again the importance of economic aid in providing the Cambodian Government with needed equipment, funds and moral support.

--Express the hope that the GOJ will be prepared to explore the possibilities for an effective multilateral approach to aid to Cambodia at the IMF-IBRD meeting in Copenhagen later this month.

B. Djakarta Three

--Refer to the visit to you by the Djakarta Three last June.

--Ask Aichi for his assessment of further constructive efforts by the Djakarta Three or the nations which composed the Djakarta Conference. Inquire specifically about the prospects for a reactivation of the ICC.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

Issues They May Raise:

1. Security Relationship (CONFIDENTIAL) - The Japanese have expressed considerable concern over the forthcoming withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea and may be feeling some uneasiness about the future U.S. defense posture in the Pacific. If Minister Aichi raises this issue, you should:

--Say that the U.S. fully intends to honor its commitments under the Nixon Doctrine. The planned withdrawals from Korea in no way adversely affect our ability to do so.

--Say that the U.S. commitment to Japan is valid, solid and enduring and you are unable to foresee a time when it would not be.

--Note that Ambassador Meyer has already begun consultations with the Foreign Minister on the U.S. base posture in Japan for the Seventies and that the U.S. Government intends to keep the Japanese Government fully informed of its future plans.

2. Okinawa Chemical Munitions - Aichi will probably express concern over the delay in removing chemical munitions from Okinawa. Removal has been delayed by the Gravel amendment and by statutory requirements for HEW review of removal plans. Johnston Island has been tentatively selected for the munitions. You should:

--Express understanding for Japanese sentiment.

--Reaffirm USG intention to remove chemical munitions from Okinawa as soon as possible.

3. U.S.-Japan Economic Relations - Aichi may express concern over the appearance of a confrontation

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

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in U.S.-Japan economic relations. If he raises the subject before you have a chance to comment on U.S.-Japan economic tensions, you should respond along those suggested lines (with the Anti-Dumping exception noted).

4. TV Anti-Dumping Case - Aichi may comment on a general Japanese suspicion that the TV Dumping case involving the withholding of Customs appraisement is in retaliation for the lapse in the textile negotiations and that the Treasury Department has unfairly changed its procedures for investigation. He may imply that Japan might raise the case in the GATT. You should:

-- Emphasize that the assumption that the Treasury action retaliates for the break-down in the textile talks is erroneous.

--State that the implementation of the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act is the responsibility of the Treasury Department. Treasury procedures are strictly in accord with the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act and the International Dumping Code.

--Japan is, of course, free to mention the case in the GATT and the U.S. is prepared to explain our dumping procedures there.

5. Indo-China

A. Paris Peace Talks - Aichi may request your views on the current status of the Paris peace talks. You should:

--Note that the essential negotiating positions of the two sides remain as outlined in the President's speech of May 1969, the other side's "10 points" issued the same month, and Thieu's electoral proposals of July 1969.

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Authority NND 969000
By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

--Note the steadfast refusal of the other side to negotiate with the GVN or to amplify or clarify their proposals in public or private discussions with us.

--Ambassador Bruce has not yet advanced any new proposals, although we continue to hope for a constructive change in the other side's attitude.

--Our negotiation posture is complicated by the need to maintain Vietnamese confidence in our steadfastness while keeping the GVN sufficiently flexible for any negotiating opportunities that may arise.

--Inquire if Aichi has any reason to believe that the other side may enter into substantive negotiations in the future.

B. Vietnamization and Pacification

--Note that Viet-Nam now enjoys greater physical security and political stability along with a lower level of enemy strength than at any time in the last several years.

--Note that the Vietnamese Armed Forces have grown in size and effectiveness enabling us to remove 20 percent of our total troop strength and one-third of our ground combat forces through last April. Reductions now in progress (50,000 by October 15 and another 100,000 by next spring) will bring our troop strength down to just over half what it was when the Administration took office.

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Clearances: EA - Ambassador Brown
EA/J - Mr. Ericson
E - Mr. Trezise
EA/VN - Mr. Tearé
EA/RA - Mr. Master (subs)
EA/LC - Mr. Corcoran

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JAPAN

Issues Paper

Okinawa reversion. In general, reversion negotiations are progressing satisfactorily, but we are not satisfied with the initial Japanese attitude on two important problems: (a) The future of American business interests on Okinawa and (b) Continuation of Voice of America broadcasting from Okinawa.

The Japanese have not agreed to Ambassador Meyer's request to Foreign Minister Aichi for an early GOJ gesture which would assure American businessmen on Okinawa about (1) their general future and (2) inclusion in reversion arrangements of specific provisions ensuring the protection and continuation of American business interests on Okinawa.

The Japanese have also not agreed to post-reversion operation of the Voice of America's Okinawa relay station which is an important element in VOA's broadcasting to the Asian mainland. The Japanese are concerned about the political repercussions and about possible conflicts with domestic legislation.

Okinawa Chemical Munitions. The Japanese are concerned about the continuing delay in removal of chemical munitions from Okinawa caused by the Gravel Amendment and by legal requirements for a painstaking HEW review of removal plans.

Textiles. US-Japan discussions on textiles have lapsed since the trip to Washington last June by MITI Minister Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Aichi which resulted in failure to reach an agreement. The Japanese industry

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

continues to oppose any voluntary resolution of the issue and thus hamstrings those portions of the GOJ which would like to reach an accommodation. Any change in the industry's position is unlikely until the prospects for US legislation are more clear.

MITI Minister Miyazawa stated publicly last week that he saw little possibility for a resumption of US-Japan talks on textile problems in view of the present atmosphere between Tokyo and Washington. (We understand his opinion is based on the lack of any encouragement from the Japanese textile industry and any change in the US position for a comprehensive agreement.)

Nevertheless, there is private recognition within the GOJ and even the industry that "something" must eventually be done to resolve the matter. At the high-level but restricted multilateral (US, Japan, EEC, and UK) meeting on general trade matters held in Geneva last July, GATT Director-General Long suggested a personal concept for a compromise proposal. It would involve agreement to discuss a long-term solution for all textiles (synthetic and cotton) following the expiration of the current LTA in 1973. In the interim, a one-year moratorium might permit an opportunity to work out a two-year arrangement until 1973.

The US representatives to the meeting preferred not to make any personal comments on the substance of the proposal but agreed to take it home for study. The Japanese representatives did the same. There have been to our knowledge no further contacts on the matter between the US and Japan.

The Executive Branch has agreed that we would be willing to resume textile talks if the GOJ accepts Long's prospectus as a basis for discussion.

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By WBD NARA Date 7/25/02

Security Relationship. In a series of meetings last month, Japanese leaders showed real concern about the pace of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia, particularly from Korea. DOD Budget projections for FY 1971-72 indicate that very substantial reductions are in store for Japan also. Ambassador Meyer has begun consultations with Foreign Minister Aichi on the question of the U.S. base posture for the seventies to enable us to conclude arrangements for the sharing of some of our more important facilities with the Japanese forces and to allow the Japanese to make an orderly disposal of those which are surplus. We don't believe that the reductions will result in a significant lessening of our deterrent capabilities.

Japanese and Capital and Trade Liberalization Actions. During your July visit to Tokyo, Finance Minister Fukuda assured you that the GOJ was determined to move ahead with a meaningful liberalization program and that "drastic measures" would be taken in both the trade and capital fields. On September 1, Japan put into effect the latest in a series of capital and trade liberalization measures designed to reduce their restrictions to a more acceptable international norm. While Japan still has a long way to go in meeting US expectations and desires, the charged atmosphere which exists as a result of confrontation on a number of economic issues makes it important that we recognize the positive features of the Japanese moves, and thus encourage an acceleration.

The announced Third State capital liberalization broadens by about 350 industries and raises to about 80% the number of industries open to foreign investment. The Cabinet also decided to advance the Fourth Stage by six months to the Fall of 1971 and will probably approve advancement to Spring of 1971 of investment liberalization in the Japanese automobile industry. The latter industry will be treated as a separate category because of its importance to the U.S. and the reluctance of the Japanese industry.

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The trade decisions remove about 14 items from the trade quota list and ease procedures on 63 of about 124 commodities remaining on a related import control list. The Cabinet is studying a further expansion and acceleration of trade liberalization which would call for a reduction of import quota items to 80 by the end of 1970, 60 by June 1971, and to 40 by December 1971 (roughly equivalent to the number maintained by West Germany). Prime Minister Sato has urged that even this plan would be insufficient and should be accelerated further. Thus, the GOJ is clearly moving toward an acceleration of its remaining trade liberalization measures and the recent actions are significant.

The programs, of course, have a number of limitations and qualifications. The Japanese still carefully circumscribe the opportunities for foreign investors through such features as the maintenance of the 50% foreign equity principle, the restriction of investment only to new rather than existing companies, and a 7% limitation on individual stock ownership. Japan also maintains a number of non-tariff and non-quota trade barriers, but these are probably only resolvable in a multilateral context.

TV Antidumping Case. On August 28 the Treasury Department announced the withholding of customs appraisement on TV sets from Japan, a step that usually precedes a Treasury finding of sales at less than fair value in antidumping cases. Treasury must now rule on this point within 90 days; if sales to the US are found to be at lower prices than in Japan, the case will go to the Tariff Commission to determine whether US industry is being injured by such sales. Assessment of dumping duties would follow an affirmative finding by the Tariff Commission and would apply to all sets entering the US after appraisement was withheld.

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The quasi-judicial investigation of this case has been under way for over two years and has been conducted in full conformance with our GATT obligations; nevertheless there have been attempts to link the Treasury decision with general US-Japan trade difficulties and the unsuccessful textile negotiations in particular. Former Ambassador Shimoda discussed with Treasury Secretary Kennedy various complaints about Treasury handling of the case, especially with regard to the Custom's Bureau's investigation of price margins. The Japanese might refer to the case during the September 21 meeting of the GATT Antidumping Committee in Geneva, but we do not believe they have grounds to charge a violation of the International Antidumping Code.

Incidentally ,recent press reports from Tokyo indicate that Japanese consumers have not been satisfied with the price information made public by manufacturers to explain why TV sets in Japan cost so much more than those in the US.

Substantial trade is involved; US imports of TV sets from Japan totalled approximately $250 million in 1969.

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Clearances: EA/J - Mr. Ericson
E - Mr. Trezise
E/STA - Mr. Prickett
EA - Ambassador Brown

EA/J:Various 9/4/70

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JAPAN

Position on UN Issues

On all major issues--Chinese Communist Representation, the Middle East and Korea--and on most other issues, Japan is in general agreement with the U.S. We differ, however, on Charter Review.

Chinese Representation - Japan will again co-sponsor the "Important Question" resolution on Chinese Communist representation in the UN.

Charter Review - Japan is pushing for Charter Review with an eye toward a semi-permanent or permanent seat for Japan on the Security Council and deletion of the "enemy state" references in the Charter. While sympathetic to the Japanese view, we believe that a review conference could not be profitably undertaken so long as fundamental differences on the proper scope and functioning of the UN continue to exist among the five permanent members and between the developed and developing states.

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Drafted by: EA/J - RYHayashida
Cleared by: EA/RA - Miss McNutt
IO/UNP - Miss Schrage
EA/J - Mr. Ericson
EA - - Ambassador Brown

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SADIXED

September 11, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Shipment of Chemical Munitions from Okinawa

It is my understanding that you plan to ship a small quantity of the chemical munitions now stored in Okinawa to Johnston Island later this month. I do not wish to go ahead with this shipment at this time.

It would be preferable that the movement of the Okinawan stocks be accomplished in a single operation when the necessary storage facilities are available.

To allay any public concern, it would also be appropriate that an environmental impact statement on the movement be reviewed by the Council on Environmental Quality before the shipments begin.

Accordingly, you should plan for these shipments sometime early in 1971. I would appreciate your informing me of when the shipments will take place.

Richard Nixon

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Reviewed by: [illegible]

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President Nixon - hijack

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